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Abstract
A general equilibrium model of the South African economy in the 1980s is
constructed, focusing on the labor-market distortions created by legal and
customary restrictions on nonwhite labor mobility. The model is static and
calibrated to the data of 1980; its simplified representation of the economy
incorporates five production sectors, two race categories, two skill levels,
and five kinds of labor-market constraints. Three counter-factual simulations
are conducted:
1. The labor-market constraints are relaxed marginally, one at a time.
Such change has little impact on either the level of GDP or its distribution.
2. The constraints are derived that would be preferred by different white
sub-groups -- were each sub-group to choose the various constraints so as to
maximize its own income. No such group has an economic motive in keeping so
many Blacks in the reserves. Beyond that, interests diverge. Urban capital
would like to expand the entry of nonwhites into the cities and into skilled
jobs. White farmers, white mining labor, and white urban unskilled labor
would like to keep nonwhites out of the cities and out of skilled jobs. White
urban skilled labor stands between these groups.
3. The outcome of perfectly free labor markets is examined, under the
assumption that the education level of nonwhites permits them to move either
slowly or rapidly into the newly accessible skilled jobs. GDP rises from five
to ten percent, and dramatic income redistribution is achieved. Some
nonwhites experience wage increases up to one half; skilled whites are not
much affected, and even the direction of the impact on them is unclear;
profits increase by as much as one fifth; and the incomes of white farmers and
unskilled white laborers may fall by more than one half.
The measured changes owing to a transition to free labor markets, large
as they are, represent no more than lower-bound estimates of the effects of
apartheid since the simulations deal only with the racial restraints on labor
markets and do not contemplate possible racial redistribution of the ownership
of land, physical capital, or human capital.
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South Africa without Apartheid: Estimates
from General Equilibrium Simulations
The actors play the rituals of their parts
-- Captains, killers, lovers, clowns -
At the end falling on those swords
That open windows to the audience
Those who consider their lives different
From the enacted play of passions.
But which are actors, truly, which the audience --
The player s who only simulate




"South Africa, evokes a morbid fascination."
3  Indeed, this fascination
evokes much scholarly, as well as angry and polemic, writing. But most of the
research into apartheid is political, sociological, historical or
philosophical in nature; and what little there is about the economic
implications is seldom quantitative. We attempt here to begin to remedy this,
providing some numbers about the extent of the misallocation of labor
resources and the redistribution of factor incomes produced by South Africa's
multifarious restrictions on nonwhite labor mobility.
A general-equilibrium picture of the South African economy is drawn
(Section II) and is empirically calibrated so as to be consistent with the
observed economy of 1980 (Section III). Three kinds of simulations are then
undertaken. The effects of marginal, piecemeal removal of the various labor-
market restrictions that apartheid imposes are shown to be very small (Section
IV). The observed labor-market restrictions are then shown to be typically
consistent with compromise among the various affected white groups, farmers,
2. Spender, 1986, p. 102.
3. So begins a recent book (Adam and Moodley, 1986) with the same title as the
first four words of this monograph.
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unskilled laborers, skilled laborers, and capitalists (Section V). Finally, a
completely free labor market (without any change in the ownership of land or
physical or human capital) is shown to raise GDP by 5-10% and to redistribute
this income significantly; nonwhite income rises by up to one third, while
total white income changes little. However, the redistribution between
different white groups is great: 1) the incomes of white unskilled workers and
white farmers may fall by as much as one half; 2) the incomes of white skilled
workers may fall by as much as one fifth; and 3) (white) profit income rises
by 15-20% (Section VI).
Before continuing further, we must alert the reader to the limitations of
the general equilibrium modeling developed here. There is no test as to
whether ours is an accurate picture of the South African economy, and the
observed data of 1980 are incorporated in such a way ("econometrics with a
single observation") that the model is necessarily consistent with those 1980
data. Among the many simplifications, there are only five sectors, two skill
levels for labor, and two races.4 The way in which outputs and inputs are
related in production is largely assumed, not estimated. The massive
complexity of apartheid is captured in only five, very simplified, labor-
market restrictions. The forms and magnitudes of these restrictions have been
changing dramatically during the last ten years, and the model here freezes
them stereotypically -- with the result that the picture presented is not only
rough but also probably not accurate for any particular recent year.
Moreover, the model is completely static in its formulation. Comparisons
between South Africa with and South Africa without apartheid are all for 1980,
a factual with a counter-factual, and give no clue about the process of
change. Finally, the title, "South Africa without Apartheid", is itself
misleading since this paper is concerned with only certain aspects of
apartheid, namely the labor-market distortions. Not only are the political
and philosophical aspects of apartheid ignored throughout, but so also are the
effects of the extreme and imposed racial land ownership patterns, of the
)4. White and nonwhite. The latter group comprises "blacks"' (or "Africans" or,
more pejoratively, "natives" or Bantu), "coloreds", and "Asians". The
myriad legal distinctions between these peoples will not be pursued here;
the disadvantage to the model of grouping them together is that coloreds
and Asians are less disfavored than blacks in actual public policy.
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distorted volumes and sectoral allocations of capital, and of the inefficient
and inequitable provision of education and other training. The estimates that
emerge from this model of the inefficiency and the income redistribution of
apartheid are clearly lower-bound estimates. 5  Alternatively, these estimates
might be called measures of the "short-run" change, in that only the effects
of reducing racial discrimination in labor markets are analyzed, while the
concomitant, but inevitably more time-consuming, changes in the volume and
distribution of physical and human capital are ignored.
Despite these shortcomings, we think the numbers should be taken
seriously, if only because they are the only ones around that have been
derived explicitly. They generally support the growing consensus among
economists about the effects of apartheid. Small, piecemeal, or gradual
changes ("the evolutionary hypothesis") will have little effect on either the
level or racial distribution of South African income. There are sizeable
efficiency losses in the present network of restrictions on the mobility of
nonwhite labor. The big losers among the whites of a significant dismantling
of the labor-market aspects of apartheid would be the unskilled laborers and
farmers.
II. The General Equilibrium Model of the South African Economy
The economic history of South Africa is fascinating and instr'uctive.6
And the history, development, semantics, and workings of apartheid are complex
and unique.? The following brief narrative foregoes much of the chronology
and complexity in order to focus on the essential workings of apartheid as a
cause of labor misallocation and as a tool of racial and functional income
redistribution.
5. Again, this assumes that our model is a useful way of viewing the South
African economy. Not all economists would agree that apartheid is
"inefficient". See, for example, the neo-Marxist writers, Davies, 1977 and
Johnstone, 1976.
6. The standard sources are Wilson and Thompson, 1971; Houghton, 1976; and
Nattrass, 1985.
7. The standard sources are Hutt, 196J4; Horwitz, 1967; and Lipton, 1985; and
for the rapidly changing policies of the mid-1980s, Greenberg, 1987.
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A little over a century ago, when diamonds and gold were first being
discovered, South Africa was mostly a land of subsistence agriculture for
black and white alike. But one prominent feature of the later apartheid
system had already become established in the rural areas: blacks either
worked separately in agricultural activities or served as unskilled laborers
on white-operated farms. What began as a de facto racial separation of land
control was increasingly written into law in the twentieth century. Beginning
with the Natives Land Act of 1913, the legal right of use and ownership of
land by blacks has been increasingly restricted to certain geographical
areas. 8
Today the result of this restriction is that whites, comprising 16% of
South Africa's population,- control 85% of the nation's agricultural land
(Nattrass, 1981, pp. 5, 7). The productivity of the white agricultural land
(the platteland) has grown steadily over the past century, aided by increased
use of capital, improved technology, the continued availability of cheap black
labor and - not least in importance - government subsidy of price and
infrastructure. Meanwhile in the black agricultural regions (variously known
over the last century and a half as scheduled areas, native reserves,
Bantustans, homelands, and Black States), to which nonwhite farmers have
increasingly been relegated to prevent the verswarting of the platteland,
productivity per acre has stagnated and productivity per person steadily
declined as the population of the reserves has rapidly grown (ibid., p. 113).
This push factor, together with the complete absence of a color bar in
agricultural employment, has meant that all agricultural work is now done by
blacks, the bw~oners of old (i.e. white landless tenants) having long since
become, first, urban "poor whites" and, more recently, the skilled part of
South Africa's urban labor force.
With the discovery of diamonds and gold in the 1860s, mining became the
wellspring of sudden, rapid, and continued South African growth. Initial
chaos in the sector was soon ordered through luck, force, the distribution of
skills, and racism. Small claims gave way to large mining corporations, owned
8. These laws have always been, in principle, as much to protect black land
from white incursion as the reverse, but in fact the purpose has been to
keep down the wages of blacks working on "European" farms by preventing
them from renting, buying, or sharecropping in "white" agricultural areas.
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by foreign capital and -- increasingly -- South African whites. The need for
skilled labor for deep-level mining opened up wage differentials favoring
skilled white workers who were scarce, and these were gradually transformed
into white-black differentials maintained by non-economic forces. The legal
reservation of high-paid jobs for white laborers, whether they were
particularly skilled or not, began with the Mines and Works Act of 1911 and
was completed after the Rand Rebellion by white unionized labor in 1922 with
even tighter "color bars". The net result of all these restrictions and
reservations has been that for the past half century about 90% of the mining
employment -- the lower paid 90% - has been filled by blacks (Wilson, 1972).
"... from 1924 onwards .. the written and unwritten rules of White-Black job
demarcation ... [have been] simply not an agenda item" (Horwitz, 1967, p.
217). Meanwhile, over this period, real white wage rates rose at better than
1% per annum, and real black wage rates rose not at all until the mid-1970s,
though fairly rapidly since then.
9
Mining growth did not immediately induce manufacturing growth in South
Africa. By 1925, barely 10% of the GDP was generated there, and that largely
in mining-related industries. The introduction of significant tariff
protection for manufacturing and the influx of low-wage workers, both black
and white, into the towns in the 1920s and 1930s provided the belated
stimulus; and the trade interruptions of the Depression and World War II
continued it. Today, manufacturing accounts for 25% of South Africa's GDP
(Nattrass, 1981, Chap. 8).
Throughout this growth, nonwhite workers were restricted to the least
skilled jobs, first by custom, the "civilized labor policy", the "rate for the
job", and "job reservation", and later by bars to nonwhite apprenticeships and
inferior nonwhite educational opportunities.
1 0  With weak or prohibited unions
for nonwhite workers, the powerful and state-supported white unions were able
9. Nattrass, 1981, pp. 139-140. In the 1980s, even the long-standing job
reservation system in the mines has begun to weaken (Lipton, 1985, pp.
207-208).
10. The "civilized labor policy" threatened withdrawal of tariff protection
from firms replacing white with nonwhite labor; the "rate for the job",
along with minimum wage standards, prevented nonwhites from displacing
whites by undercutting wages; "job reservation" specified jobs that could
not legally be filled by nonwhites.
to bargain for the best jobs at the best pay for their members, and South
African factories evolved into "multi-racial teams of non-competing workers"
with whites doing only the top-rung jobs. 1 1
In the last quarter century, the rate of growth of manufacturing has
outrun the ability of white labor to supply its increasing need for skilled
labor. Responding pragmatically, white unions and management have agreed to
move nonwhites up the job-ladder. Those whites who vacated the lowest white
rung were promoted into better jobs, and the nonwhites who replaced them often
arrived to find the job "diluted" or "fragmented." 1
2 Today, if one separates
the labor in manufacturing into unskilled and skilled, one finds almost all of
the unskilled jobs in the hands of nonwhites and a vast majority of the
skilled jobs still in the hands of whites.
The development of the "other" sectors - trade, transport, construction,
government, etc. -- has paralleled that of manufacturing with respect to the
racial composition of labor, with one significant exception. The government
has traditionally found ways to protect the living standards of the least
skilled whites by insisting that employers - often government itself - pay a
"civilized wage" to whites doing practically identical work as low-paid
nonwhites. But despite this special protection for the least-skilled whites,
the overall picture in these other sectors is the same as in manufacturing.
Whites do most of the skilled work, and nonwhites do almost all the unskilled
work; nonwhites have been permitted to move up the job-ladder into skilled
jobs only as white labor scarcity necessitates. 1 3
11. The quote is from Frankel, 1947.
12. By the words, "diluted" and "fragmented", is meant that the former white
job was broken down into two or more nonwhite jobs each of which required
less skill, or could be perceived by whites as requiring less skill. This
dilution could be nevertheless cost-effective since the wage rates of the
new nonwhites were usually so much lower than the rate formerly earned by
the white employee. See Porter, 19814, and Knight and McGrath, 1987.
13. Here, another dramatic change is in process: nonwhite job advances have
recently begun to move at a pace faster than white labor scarcity
dictates, with the precedential appearance in South Africa of unemployment
among unskilled whites.
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In addition to the regulations about the kinds of jobs and the numbers in
which nonwhite labor could be utilized in the so-called white economy,
apartheid restricted the number of blacks who could migrate out of the
reserves into "European" agriculture, mining, and urban employment. Beginning
with the Stallard Commission in 1922 -- which formulated the principle that a
black "should only be allowed to enter the urban areas ... to minister to the
needs of the white man, and should depart therefrom when he ceases so to
minister" -- adult blacks had to carry a "pass", a proof of their permission
to work in a particular white area.l4 These "influx controls" have always
been imperfectly enforced and, especially recently, much circumvented, but
they have served to limit the movement of blacks from the agricultural sector
of the Black reserves (i.e. African reserves) to the "white" sectors (i.e.
"European" farming, mining, manufacturing, and other urban activities).
With declining living standards in the African reserves and ever
increasing opportunities for employment, skilled as well as unskilled, in
manufacturing and other urban sectors, black workers began to flow toward the
South African cities at a rat.e faster than the "pass laws" could contain. And
the urban jobs to which they flowed required a more stable labor force than
the principle of temporary African migrancy into white areas could provide.
In the 1950s, with the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Acts, certain
nonwhites were given residency rights in the cities -- called "section 10"
rights. Those who could acquire such rights could work regularly in the well-
paid urban sectors of the economy; without such rights they could not, at
least without risks.
Beyond the inequitable distribution of land ownership and restrictions on
the mobility of nonwhite labor, the system of apartheid relied heavily on the
unequal provision of education to maintain the racial income disparities. Not
only was access to apprenticeships denied nonwhites but little general
education was offered them and even that of little quality. The practice of
restricting expenditure on black education to the amount collected in direct
black taxation was dropped in 1972 (by the Education Account Abolition Act) ,
but progress has been slow. While the average white adult in South Africa has
completed 10 years of schooling, urban nonwhites receive much less and rural
14. The Stallard Commission quote is from Rogers, 1976, p. 10.
nonwhites almost none ,at all; and expenditure per student is about one seventh
as much for blacks as for whites (Cooper, 1984, p.420).
During the past ten years, with increased international attention and
internal unrest, the formal legal apartheid restrictions began to be softened
(Greenberg, 1987, passim). Following the Riekert Commission report (1979),
government enforcement of apartheid was steadily reduced and now has been
almost entirely abandoned. Throughout the last decade, nonwhite progress has
been enhanced continually by the need for more skilled workers than the growth
of the white labor supply can satisfy, and nonwhite wage rates have risen more
rapidly, both for skilled and unskilled workers. But behind the official
neutrality and the semantics of "separate development" in independent Black
Homelands, the essential characteristic of the apartheid system -- constraint
on the mobility of nonwhite labor -- has continued, supported by custom,
history, racism, unions, housing, education, and the general milieu of
government policy. Apartheid is in flux (in the late 1980s), and the static
picture of it that we are about to draw is not only simplified but also
probably not accurate for any. particular year of the early 1980s.
A viable theoretical picture of the South African economy must
distinguish five sectors of economic activity. These are (with the
identifying subscripts that will be later used in parentheses):
1. Black reserve agriculture (b for Black). Here, unskilled
nonwhite workers toil with poor land, little capital, few
intermediate inputs, and primitive technology.
2. European agriculture (e for European). What is "European" here
is the ownership and management, entirely white South African.
The labor, beyond that of the white owner/operator, is done by
unskilled nonwhites. Size is large, capital is significant,
state support is extensive, and technology is modern.
3. Mining (g for told and other mining). 1 5  Predominantly
comprised of modern, large, corporate gold and diamond mining
operations, this sector utilizes a thin vein of white
15. The letter j is used here to save the letter m for _manufacturing.
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employees and a large lode of mostly unskilled, mostly migrant
nonwhites. 16 In the model developed here, we ignore the facts
that transient labor is employed and that many of the mining
workers are still recruited from outside South Africa's
borders. Some of the costs of apartheid that will be estimated
here are therefore both spread over larger numbers of workers
and borne by non-South-African nonwhites.
4. Manufacturing (m for manufacturing). Firms in this sector
utilize unskilled labor, almost all done by nonwhites, as well
as skilled labor. The skilled work is increasingly done by
nonwhite labor as the scarcity of skilled whites
necessitates.i1 The job-ladder that we consider here consists
of just these two rungs, skilled labor and unskilled labor.
5. The "other" sectors (o for other). A catchall of the remaining
(i.e. non-manufacturing) urban sectors, firms here also use
almost entirely nonwhite unskilled labor and employ a small
percentage of nonwhites in the skilled-labor category. This
sector includes not only private profit-seeking firms but also
government per se and many public corporations (in transport,
communications, etc.), but we will ignore the fact that these
latter entities have objectives other than profit in their
hiring activities.
The general equilibrium model incorporating these five sectors will deal
only with the production and supply side. Demand can be ignored provided we
can think of South Africa as a small open economy with no untraded goods. It
is arguably not small with respect to its mining sector; we ignore this. It
is open, but both import and export taxation separate its internal prices from
world prices; we ignore nontariff protection and never consider the impact of
16. The migrancy of mining labor is an historical phenomenom that is fading
only slowly today, long after its original function has eroded. See
Wilson, 1972, Johnstone 1976, and Lipton, 1985.
17. In manufacturing, and in the "other" sector discussed next, nonwhite means
not only blacks of African origin but also workers of mixed racial and
Indian/Pakistani origin. The reader is reminded that these distinctions
are not pursued here.
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changes in South Africa's system of border taxation. There are many untraded
goods (and, more so, services), primarily in the "other" sector; the fact that
their prices are domestically determined is ignored.
First we write production functions for each of the five sectors. They
are all constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production functions that
display diminishing returns to (skilled and unskilled) labor to reflect the
fixity of other factors. The value of output (i.e. value added in South
African prices) is represented by Q, and the quantity of labor by L.
Subscripts are added, whenever needed, to indicate the sector (b, e, g, m, or
o), the skill level of labor (s for skilled or u for unskilled), and the race
of the labor (n for nonwhite or w for white). The production function
parameters are, for each sector, A, C, and E. 1 9  The five production
functions:
(1) Qb = AbC(LnbV-Eb + Cb-1/Eb;
(2) Qe = Ae[(Lne + Lwe)-Ee + Ce]-1/Ee;
(3) Qg = Ag[ (Lng + L g)-Eg + Cg]- 1/Eg;
(4) Qm = Am[Bm(Lnum + Lwum)-Em + (Lnsm + Lwsm)-Em + Cm3-1/Em; and
(S) Q0 = Ao[Bo(Lnuo + Lwuo)-Eo + (Lnso + Lwso)-Eo + Co]-1/E° ,
The sum of the five values of Q is of course GDP. The sum of the
thirteen labor variables is the total South African employed labor force.
18. Principally capital and, in the two agricultural sectors, land and, in the
mining sector, resource stocks.
19. In a CES function, the elasticity of substitution is equal to (1/(1+E)).
Note, in what follows, that there is but one elasticity of substitution,
applying equally to the substitutability between the two different kinds
of labor and between labor and the unspecified other (i.e. land, capital,
and/or resource) factors. Note also that, for the two sectors using both
skilled and unskilled labor, a distribution parameter, B, is needed. The
production functions, and their empirical content, are further discussed
in Appendix B.
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Changes in unemployment are not considered here.2 0 Wage rates are assumed to
adjust to assure the given employment level of each relevant labor group. 2 1
Thus the labor-supply equations for each of the two racial groups being
considered are
(6) Lnb + Lne + Lng + Lnum + Lnsm + Lnuo + Lnso = Ln and
(7) Lwe + Lwg + Lwum + Lwsm + Lwuo + Lwso =Lw,
where Ln and Lw are the total supplies available of nonwhite and white labor,
respectively.
The values of the Cs in the production functions will be taken as given
throughout the exercises conducted here. Since the parameter, C, contains the
influence of the non-labor inputs, this means that the past allocations of
capital to the different sectors, however distorted by the labor allocation
restrictions imposed by various apartheid constraints, will not be reallocated
during the simulations of other situations. Hence, apartheid's misallocations
of capital will not be counted in the estimates of the costs or
redistributions attributable to apartheid. 2 2
In order to model the restrictions placed on labor allocations by
apartheid, it is useful to define five new ratio variables, the Zs in
equations (8) - (12):
(8) Lnb = Zb(Ln);
(9) Lng Z=Zg(Lng + Lwg);
(10) Lnsm = Zm(Lnsm + Lwsm);
20. Neither are changes in the fraction of that employment drawn from
neighboring countries nor changes in the degree of underemployment in the
"reserves".
21. Or, for whites in some of the scenarios we will consider, various policy
rules may intrude in order to insure full employment.
22. Land endowments are also implicit in the Cs of the two agricultural
sectors, Black (b) and European (e), and these too are not reallocated in
the simulations.
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(11) Lnso = Zo(Lnso + Lwso); and
(12) Lnum + Lnuo + Lnsm + Lnso Z= x(Ln).
Zb is the fraction of the entire nonwhite labor force that is kept in the
Black reserves. Zg is the fraction of the total (recall, g for gold) mining
labor force that is composed of nonwhite workers. Zm and Zo are the ratios of
the nonwhite skilled labor to the total skilled labor utilized in
manufacturing and "other" sectors, respectively. And Zx is the fraction of
the nonwhite labor force that works in the largely urban manufacturing and
"other" sectors.
Apartheid places restrictions on each of these Zs. Zb is fixed by means
of "influx control", which prevents blacks from moving freely from the
reserves to the different "white" sectors of the economy. 2 3  Zg is fixed by
the long-standing, quasi-legal agreements between mining corporations and the
white mining unions. The values of Zm and Zo used to be fixed at times by
explicit "job reservation" but are now more implicitly arranged through
traditions and negotiations between the individual firms (and groups of firms)
and their white employees. Zx is determined by the fraction of the nonwhite
labor force that has gained access to the manufacturing and "other" largely
urban sectors.24 In a free market, each of these Z variables would be free to
vary from zero to one as the wage rates faced by employers should dictate.
Indeed, corner solutions at zero or one would eventuate unless the wage rate
of identical workers of different races were identical. Under apartheid,
however, the Z variables are not free to vary so widely in response to market
forces. The formal and fixed way in which we treat the imposition of the Z
constraints is more appropriate to a model of apartheid in the early 1980s
than to today. The following inequalities indicate in a general way the
constraints that apartheid places on the five Zs:
(13) 0 < < Zb < Zb < 1;
23. This used to be determined by "pass laws", now removed, and is currently
more subtly effected by job availability.
24. Once restricted to "section 10" rights-holders, this is now more loosely
determined by the availability of housing in these areas.
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(14) 0 < Zg < Zg < Zg < 1;
(15) 0 < m < Zm < Zm < 1;
(16) 0 < o < Zo < Zo < 1; and
(17) 0 < ZX < ZX < ZX < 1.
In each of the above strings of inequalities, the Z represents the lower limit
that the Z can assume and the Z represents the upper limit.25 Specifically,
apartheid imposes a left-hand constraint on Zb, in inequalities (13), and
right-hand constraints on the other four Zs, in inequalities (14) - (17). The
use of only five labor-mobility constraints is of course a great
oversimplification of the web of nonwhite labor controls woven through the
South African economic fabric. Certainly, for example, the implication that
nonwhites who manage to leave the homelands are completely free to choose
between jobs in European agriculture and jobs in mining is quite unrealistic.
Another implication, that Africans with "section 10" rights are completely
mobile structurally and geographically between the various employers of the
manufacturing and "other" sectors, is also far from realized in fact. 2 6
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear whether the model's stylized
simplifications of the restraints on nonwhite labor mobility lead to
overestimates or underestimates of the force of apartheid.
Some whites are unable or unwilling to work in skilled jobs - the Lum
and Lwuo in equations (4) and (5). The system protects their wages from
dropping to the level of the unskilled nonwhites who do similar jobs and
protects them from unemployment in their competition with much lower paid
nonwhites by white union insistence, formal wage differentials, and job
reservations. Here, we will capture this in the following simple manner:
2 7
25. All the Z ratios are constrained by definition to be between zero and one.
26. These simplifications underlie, and indeed necessitate, the introduction
of wage differentials (the D parameters) later on.
27. The simplicity of treatment is justified on the grounds that relatively
few workers are involved -- barely a tenth of the white labor force works
in what are called unskilled positions. This treatment ignores the major
visible change in South Africa in the late 1980s: the removal of all
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(18) Lwum = Lwum;
(19) Lwuo = Lwuo; and
(20) Yu = F Yurb
Equations (18) and (19) insure that these unskilled whites become employed,
through some kind of front-of-the-queue arrangements, regardless of how
uncompetitive their wages are relative to equally productive nonwhites. Lwum
and Lwuo are the total numbers of unskilled whites that present themselves for
jobs in these two sectors, and they are in fact always the first employed in
such jobs. Equation (20) fixes the wage rate of such unskilled whites (Yu) at
a multiple of the wage rate of unskilled urban nonwhite labor (Yurb). The
parameter F would be one in a free market (or less than one if no nonwhite
unskilled workers were employed). But F is set by government regulations well
above one under apartheid protection of the standard of living of unskilled
whites. 2 8
White farmers, who own and operate the farms of the European agricultural
sector, generally also work there. Hence their inclusion in the labor input
of equation (2). They themselves insure that they are not unemployed, and
their sizeable incomes relative to the nonwhites that also work there is owing
to their receipt of land rent and capital earnings. Here, we capture all this
by simply writing
(21) Lwe = Lwe.
Uneducated labor is not the same thing as educated labor. We will
consider this in a very simple manner, namely, by assuming that the rate of
return to schooling is 6%, at all levels of schooling. 2 9  Roughly, this means
formal job reservation and appearance of unemployment among unskilled
whites.
28. This use of F is the mirror image of the assumption of no white unskilled
unemployment. This assumption too has become obsolete, and dramatically
so, in the late 1980s.
29. The few attempts to measure this rate of return to education in South
Africa have uncovered figures nearly double 6%, for the primary and
secondary education of whites, but almost inevitably a large part of this
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that the wage rate of a laborer, and the marginal product of that laborer, is
6% higher than it would have been, as a result of each year of schooling. 3 0
Because we are interested in the distribution of income between races,
and not between people of the same race, because of data limitations, and
because the 6% assumption makes the variance of educational attainment
irrelevant for the average wage, we can define units of "effective labor" that
are adjusted for the average schooling of each race. Normalizing so that one
nonwhite laborer is defined as one "effective laborer", we must now take
account of both numbers of white laborers and numbers of "effective" white
laborers, where the latter are higher than the former by a factor of (1.06)
raised to a power; the power is the difference between the average years of
schooling of whites and the average years of schooling of nonwhites. 3 1
Given the total nonwhite employment Ln and given the fraction that is
retained in the reserves Zb, the Black agricultural production function
(equation (1)) determines the value of output, the value of the average
product of labor, and the value of the marginal product of labor there.
Because the land in the reserves is owned by the blacks who farm it, the
average product of labor there measures the standard of living; but it is the
marginal product that is relevant to the decision whether or not a family
should send (if permitted) a marginal family member to the "white" sectors for
work. Let us call this marginal product of labor in the Black reserves the
"wage", ynbla; partial derivation of equation (1) yields
(22) Ybla = Ab[1 + Cb(Lnb)Eb]-(1+Eb)/Eb.
The bla superscript refers to Black (reserve) agriculture. This "wage", Ybla,
would of course be equal to the wage received by unskilled nonwhites in all
measured return is due to the innately greater capacities of those who
complete more schooling. See Trotter, 1977, p.357.
30. The cost of a year's schooling is principally the foregone wage rate that
could have been earned by a worker with a year less schooling. The return
to the schooling is a flow of additional income that is 6% higher each
year for the remainder of the worker's active life. Ignoring depreciation
of human capital, the finiteness of life, and the other resource costs of
education, the assumed 6% return implies a wage and marginal product that
is 6% higher.
31. This ignores the difference in the educational quality of those years.
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the other, so-called "white" sectors if they were free to choose the sector in
which they worked. With binding apartheid constraints on emigration from the
African reserves, Ynbla provides no more than a lower bound for the nonwhite
wage rates in the "white" parts of the economy.
This wage of unskilled nonwhite workers in the modern sectors must be, by
competitive pressures, equal across sectors between which such workers are
mobile and equal to the value of the marginal product of unskilled labor in
sectors where no imposed marginal labor-use restrictions apply. Writing ynur
for the basic wage of workers who escape the Black reserves but fail to
acquire "section 10" rights - and hence are only eligible for jobs in
European agriculture and the mines -- and partially differentiating equation
(2) with respect to Lnb:
(23) Yrur= Ae1 + Ce(Lne + Lwe)Eej(1+Ee)/Ee.
The rur superscript refers to the rural sectors, European agriculture and
mining. While there also are white workers in this production function, they
are the white owner/operators and, obviously, hire themselves first.
Similarly, wage-equals-marginal-product equations can be written for the
unskilled nonwhite labor in the two urban sectors, manufacturing and "other".
The wage in these sectors is written Ynrb, with the urb superscript for urban:
(241) D urb + E + + L )E ](l+Em)/Em.D4DnumbYAmBm[Bm+Cm(Lnum+Lwum)E{(Lnum+Lwum)/(Lnsm+Lwsm))
and
(25) yurb=A B0CB0+Co(Lnuo+Lwuo)Eo+{(Lnuo+Lwuo)/(Lnso+Lwso)}Eo](1+Eo)/Eo,
Note the D parameter in equation (24).32 In the empirical work, we shall
find that the wage rates of supposedly identical workers (i.e. identical in
all of skill, race, and job mobility) are not quite equalized among the
different sectors. The possible sources of such differentials are myriad, and
we will not try to track them down. Instead, we will accept these gaps as
educational or non-pecuniary-benefit differentials whose relative size is
32. Other D parameters will appear in equations to come.
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unaffected by the changes in apartheid rules that we shall simulate. 3 3  The
values of D are normalized (to one) for European agriculture in the two "white
rural" sectors and for "other" in the two "white urban" sectors. The various
D parameters thus indicate the ratio of wage rates elsewhere to wage rates in
the sector that is normalized. 314
A few words are necessary about the workings of the labor markets
implicit in equations (24) and (25). Both whites and nonwhites work in these
sectors (manufacturing and other) as unskilled labor, but the white wage rate
for unskilled labor does not enter the equation calling for the equality of
wage rate and marginal productivity. In our model's (rapidly becoming
obsolescent) picture of a rigid racial protection of unskilled whites in South
Africa, an adequate number -of unskilled jobs are reserved for the unskilled
whites, and nonwhites are not hired until these are filled. This protects the
potentially most endangered white group from wage and employment competition
with the vast numbers of unskilled and low-wage nonwhites. Thus, j
margin, once the unskilled whites have been infra-marginally hired, employment
decisions are based on a comparison of the nonwhite wage and the marginal
product of such labor. 35
Things are more complex in the mining sector (g) because employers are
required to hire (1-Zg) white workers - at skilled white workers' wage rates
-- for each Zg nonwhite workers they hire. Thus, the value of the marginal
product of labor in this sector will be equal to a weighted average of the
nonwhite rural wage rate Yrur and the white wage rate of skilled workers, Y.
This weighted average equation:
(26) ZgDngYrur + (1-Zg)DwgY = Ag[1 + Cg(Lng+L g)Eg-(1+Eg)/Eg.
33. Some of the differentials for nonwhites are almost certainly caused by
apartheid barriers that escape the simplified model presented here. In
the simulations, this assumption forces us to ignore such aspects of
apartheid's distortions.
314. Precise definitions and calculations of all the D parameters are given in
Appendix C.
35. The same phenomenon occurred in the European agricultural sector, i.e.
equation (23), although there the priority is much more direct -- the
white farm owners naturally employ themselves first before considering how
many nonwhite employees to engage.
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Competition between white and nonwhite workers is prevented in a
different manner among skilled workers. The more skilled of the skilled jobs
are reserved for whites, and the less skilled of the skilled jobs are opened
to nonwhites. If we assume that these two parts of the skill ladder must be
expanded or contracted together (i.e. the two are perfect complements), then
the marginal decision on hiring skilled labor involves both wage rates, that
of whites and that of nonwhites. Skilled workers in manufacturing and "other"
sectors are therefore seen as being hired on a weighted basis -- (1-Zm)
skilled whites at higher pay for every Zm skilled nonwhites at lower pay in
manufacturing (and, with Z0 replacing Zm, ditto for the "other" sector). The







Nonwhite wage rates for skilled workers in the manufacturing (m) 
and
"other" (o) sectors are typically higher than those received by unskilled
workers -- quite independently of any educational differentials 
-- because
such workers have acquired marketable skills and must work with special care
and punctuality. We will not explore the sources of these differentials but
rather treat them as inalterable parameters, Dnsm and Dnso. The differential
between white skilled and white unskilled workers, on the other hand, is not
assumed fixed; rather it is determined by the economic workings of the model.
Implicit, therefore, in the formulation of equations (27) and (28) is the
assumption that nonwhite skilled workers are drawn from the same labor pool as
all other nonwhite workers but that white skilled workers comprise a distinct
group that does not compete with white unskilled workers.
This completes the formal model. When the inequalities of (13) - (17)
are all binding, converting them into equations setting the levels of the Z
variables, there are 28 equations in 28 unknown variables. To recapitulate,
these variables are: five output values (Qb Ge' Qgs Gm, and Q0 ), five wage
rates (Yl r~ur, rb yu and Ye), seven nonwhite labor quantities (Lnb,
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Lne. Lng, Lnum, Lnsm, Lnuo, and Lnso), six white labor quantities (Lwe, LWg,
Lwum, Lwsm, Lwuo, and Lwso), and five Z ratios (Zb, Zg, Zm, Z0 , and Zx). When
the inequalities (12) - (15) are not narrowed to the point that they determine
the Z values, the solution process is more complex. 36
The restrictions, distortions, and redistributions of South Africa's
apartheid reside in the values of the Zs and in the constraints on them
(inequalities (13) - (17)). Our measures of the impact of apartheid will
emerge from varying these constraints. 3 7  But first, the basis of the later
comparisons must be made explicit -- the South African economy of 1980.
III. The South African Economy in 1980
In this brief section, we develop a picture of the South African economy
in 1980. Obviously, it is not intended to be a very detailed picture, being
static and limited to the variables (and combinations of variables) utilized
in the model of Section II. Rather, our intention here is to provide a
benchmark sketch of reality to which we can compare the outcomes of the
various counterfactual simulations that make up the remainder of this paper. 3 8
This basic structure of the economy is shown in Table III-1.39 GDP is
the number at the bottom of the "row-total" column of the table, R58.089
billion. Along the bottom line of the table, this GDP total is divided up: on
the left of the GDP figure into the output (i.e. the value added) of the five
sectors with which we work; and on the right of the GDP figure into the factor
36. This problem will arise in Section V. The basic apartheid model of this
section can be examined with the help of "Eureka"; the program is shown in
Appendix F (file name: APARTHEI).
37. The parameter, F (see equation (20), is also an artificial constraint
favoring the income of unskilled white laborers, and its effect will also
be examined, but not until Section VI. This lesser concern is justified
by the fact that F has no allocative impact on the model (i.e. F does not
enter equations (2'4) and (25), where the employment of unskilled labor is
determined) .
38. The benchmark year is chosen for statistical convenience, not because the
model of Section II is thought to be especially appropriate to that year.
39. For the sources and derivations of the data, see Appendix A.
- 21 -
Table III-1
South African Economic Structure. 19801,2














-- -- . -- 4.133







- - -- 1.694 0.414 1.280
10.790 6.204 7.671 24.666 -- 24.666
0.414 3.403 13.432 13.139 27.701 58.089
(=GDP)
14.717 43.372
Notes: 1. All figures in billions of 1980 Rands.
2. -- indicates zero. (But see notes 3 - 5.)
3. All income in Black agriculture is listed under IFOO. Some
unknown fraction properly belongs under labor income.
4. Where there is only one kind of labor, its income is included
under "unskilled".
5. IFOO = incomes of farm owner/operators. This includes returns
to the owner's capital and labor as well as land.
6. Totals of the sector columns or of the race columns (the totals
of each are identical).
incomes of whites and nonwhites. In the "row-totals" column of the table, the
GDP is divided up into the factor shares received by labor and nonlabor
inputs. Farm incomes (IFOO) 4 0 are reported separately from both wage incomes
and profit. 4 1
The internal entries in the matrix of Table III-1 give the breakdowns of
income by both the factor recipient and either the sector of income generation
or the race of the recipient. The dividing line between skilled and unskilled
labor is inevitably arbitrary. 42  Two other arbitrary procedures in the table
need clarification. One, all Black farm income has been included there as
IFOO; although some of it is surely attributable, and even directly paid, to
labor, we do not know how much. 4 3 And two, for the two agricultural sectors
and for mining, where only. one kind of labor is included in the production
function that we consider, the labor income is entered in the table under
"unskilled" labor. This is for convenience only. Labor allocations are shown
in Table 111-2, as percentages of the totals for each of the two race
categories.
We are interested in discovering, through the counterfactual simulations,
both the efficiency costs and the racial and functional income redistribution
that apartheid imposes. The efficiency costs will be measured simply by
reference to GDP. Because of our small-open-economy assumption and our
ignoring of border taxes, GDP performs well as a scalar measure of the
economic efficiency.
40. IFOO= incomes of farm owner/operators.
41. This is a visually useful division, but it is certainly not precise. Much
that is in the IFOO row (especially in the European agricultural sector)
is undoubtedly profit in the sense of a rate of return to capital; and
much that is in the profit row (especially in the mining sector) is
undoubtedly a return to resource ownership rather than reproducible
capital.
~42. See Appendix A for discussion of this division.
43. See the discussion of Ynbla in Appendix C. The implicit wage earnings of




Allocation of Labor in South Africa, 1980
(As Percentage of Total Labor by Race
1 )
Agriculture
Black Euro. Mining Manuf. "Other" Totals
Nonwhite Labor 13% 19% 11% 15% 42% 100%
Unskilled 14% 39%
Skilled 1% 3%
White Labor -2 1% 5% 20% 74% 100%
Unskilled 3% 12%
Skilled 17% 61%
Notes: 1. Percentages may not add due to rounding.
2. - means zero; 0% means less than 0.5%.
No simple scalar is ever entirely adequate as a measure of the equity of
the income distribution. This is especially true here. Thus, we shall use
several. First, there is the question of the distribution between wage and
nonwage incomes. To some extent this is an indication of racial distribution,
since very little nonwage income is earned by nonwhites.44 But principally we
shall refer to wage income as a percentage of GDP as an indication of the
extent of change in the class structure of rewards -- between proletariat and
capitalist. In these calculations, the "proletariat" includes both nonwhite
and white workers (and also, rather inappropriately, the incomes of farm
owner/operators). The "capitalist" includes not only those who earn the
returns on capital but also those who receive rents on the natural resources
of the mining sector. In 1980, total wage income (including IFOO) as a
percentage of GDP was 57.54%.
For summary statistics of racial distribution, two will be used. One,
the percentage of total wage income earned by whites.4 5  This percentage in
1980 was 55.97%. And two, the percentage of total income (i.e. GDP) earned by
whites (in wages, rents and profits). This percentage in 1980 was 74.66%.146
Finally, various Lorenz curves will be drawn and Gini coefficients
calculated as another way of looking at inequality. Since we do not use
population figures but rather labor force data only, and since we have no
information on the distribution of profit income across the labor force (and
across non-laborers), we cannot calculate the usual Lorenz curve for purposes
of international comparison. But we will be able to use our Lorenz curves for
comparing the base 1980 distribution with different counterfactual
simulations. For the reader's information (only, at this point), the 1980
benchmark Lorenz curves are shown in Figure III-1, for labor income (including
IFOO) only and for all income (on the assumption that all profit is earned by
44. In the model, only that attributable to land and capital in the Black
agriculture -- not a large amount. In reality, nonwhites earn some urban
nonwage income, ignored here.
45. IFO0 is counted throughout as wage income.
46. The three percentages reported in this and the preceding paragraph are, of
course, not independent of each other:
0.7466 = 1 - (0.5754)(1 - 0.5597).
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Figure III-1
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Notes: 1. Profit income included (and attributed to
final infinestesimal 'portion of the labor
force).
2. Labor income only (including incomes of
farm owner/operators (IFOO)).
the richest, infinitesimally small portion of the population). The Gini
coefficients for these two Lorenz curves are .45 and .68, respectively.
IV. Simulations: Dismantling Racial Constraints One at a Time
Apartheid is an interrelated network of constraints, political and
personal as well as economic, and it is, as they say, "academic" to think of
relaxing these constraints one at a time. But we have already, in the name of
theory, counted the number of labor-market restrictions as five, and we now
proceed to look at each of these restrictions separately, in an effort to see
quantitatively how much each affects the key economic magnitudes of the South
African economy.
First, we examine the restrictions marinally. How would the economy
have been altered (in 1980) by changing each, in turn, of the Z restrictions
"a little"? Then a larger range of change for each of the Zs is examined, but
again with only one of the Z restrictions being changed at a time.
The marginal impacts are reported in Table IV-1 in the form of
elasticities -- that is, the percentage change in various variables that is
occasioned by a one percent change in the relevant Z coefficient, with the
other Z coefficients held constant (at their actual 1980 values). The Z
coefficients are changed in the direction that increases GDP, which means that
the elasticities are for a one-percentage-point decrease in Zb and for a one-
percentage-point increase in each of the four others (Zg, Zm, Z0 , and Zx).
These elasticities differ somewhat -- usually not much -- according to which
of the 64 possible combinations of the production function coefficients are
employed. Not all combinations were tried, for it quickly becomes apparent
that the range of outcomes is small. Nevertheless, the true range of
elasticities over all 64 combinations may in some cases be wider than those
reported in Table IV-1.
The remarkable thing about Table Tv-i is how small the elasticities are.
A one-percentage-point change in one of the Zs rarely changes GDP by as much
as one tenth of one percentage point. And almost the same thing is true of
total white income, total wage income, and white wage income. Though the
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Table IV-1
Elasticities of Economic Variables with Respect to Labor-Market Restrictions
----- __Labor Market Restriction Changed mi
Economic
VariableZ4IZ^L
GDP 0.0 3  0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0/0.1
Qb -0.5/-0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Qe 0.4 -1.8/-0.7 0.0 0.0 -1.7/-1.6
Qg 0.0 0.2/0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.2
Qm 0.0 0.0/0.1 0.0/0.1 0.0 0.2
Qo 0.0 0.1/0.2 0.0 0.0/0.1 0.3
Ybla 0.5/2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ynur -0.41-0.1 0.5/0.8 0.0 0.0 0.5/1.9
Yurb 0.0 0.0 0.0/0.1 0.1/0.2 -1.4/-0.4
Yu 0.0 0.0 0.0/0.1 0.1/0.2 -1.4/-0.4
Yw 0.0 -0.4/0.0 -0.1/0.0 -0.2/0.0 0.2/0.6
Total White
Income 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0/0.2
Total Wage
Income 4  0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0/0.1
White Wage
Income 4  0.0/0.1 -0.5/-0.1 -0.1/0.0 -0.1/0.0 0.1/0.2
Notes: 1. Only one Z is changed; the others are held constant at their
1980 values. The slash indicates the range of elasticities
that emerge from different combinations of production function
parameters.
2. Zb is reduced; all other Zs are increased.
3. 0.0 means between -0.5 and +0.5. Only one number is given if all
combinations of parameters yield the same elasticity (to one
decimal place).
4. Wage incomes include incomes of farm owner/operators (IFO).
magnitudes are small, the directions are interesting and deserve a closer
look:
Zb. A decrease in Zb -- i.e. permitting more black laborers to leave the
Black reserves -- lowers output there, but never in percentage terms by more
than the percentage decline in labor. Since none of the other Zs are
changing, these new migrants go to European agriculture where output expands
marginally.
Zg. When blacks are permitted to do a larger fraction of the mining
jobs, blacks move from European agriculture to mining (as the sizeable output
changes indicate). 4 7  Rural nonwhite wage-earners gain from the movement, and
urban white wage-earners are hurt to the extent that their supply is augmented
by the former white miners.
Zm and Zo. Marginally opening up skilled jobs to nonwhites in the
manufacturing and "other" sectors has little impact on outputs or incomes.
With Zx fixed, the new skilled nonwhites must come from the pool of existing
urban unskilled nonwhites. Urban nonwhites gain slightly, and skilled urban
whites lose slightly. But in neither column is any elasticity bigger in
absolute value than 0.2.
Zx. Opening the cities to nonwhites, again marginally, draws them
largely from European agriculture, not mining. Rural nonwhites are
significantly helped by this; significantly hurt are the urban nonwhites --
those who were already in the cities, not of course the new arrivals. White
skilled labor is benefited, as the scarcity of skilled labor is enhanced by
the influx of new unskilled labor.
Figures IV-1 through IV-5 show how GDP moves for a broad range of
movements of each of the Z values (still one at a time). 4 8 Only for Figure
IV-1 does the choice of Ab matter, and all four cases are shown there.
Dropping Zb to zero raises GDP by barely R1.0 billion. Raising Zg half the
47. In fact, some of such job growth as this would be filled by urban workers,
but the stylized structure of the model precludes that.
48. The curves in those figures are drawn only for the production function
parameter cases where all the elasticities of substitution are equal to
1/2 or all equal to 2.
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FIGURE IV-1.
GDP for Varying Levels of Zb
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way to one increases GDP by less than R1.0 billion. A 50% increase in either
Zm or Zo raises GDP by around RO.5 billion. And no change in Zx can raise GDP
by as much as R1.0 billion.
Is there a lesson from 1all this one-at-a-time examination of the
"dismantling" of the apartheid restrictions. Even sizable improvements in the
network of labor-market constraints have small effects on total output and its
distribution when the changes are made in piecemeal fashion. The network is
too intertwined and interactive for single changes to do much. For example,
consider the increase in Zx, the fraction of nonwhites permitted into the
cities. How productive can this be when the new entrants must be drawn from
European agriculture and mining (since Zb is unchanged) and are constrained to
take unskilled jobs (since Zm and Zo are unchanged)? More than marginal,
piecemeal change is needed if apartheid's creation is to be significantly
transformed.
V. Simulations: Who Wants What Labor-Market Restrictions?
Real knowledge of the role of the different white groups in the
determination of the many apartheid restrictions on the allocation of nonwhite
labor would require not only political analysis but also historical research.
Neither has been more than touched on here. But the model and its numerical
potential can tell us what kind of labor-market restrictions would serve to
maximally promote the economic interests of particular groups within the white
community of South Africa. Where the restrictions that maximize the well-
being of a particular group and the observed restrictions are similar, the
similarity suggests that the group played an important historical role in the
introduction of those restrictions or at least plays an important political
role in their continuation. In this section, we pursue hints of this nature.
The pursuit is straightforward. The incomes of various white groups, and
combinations of groups, are maximized using the model of Section II with
respect to the choice of all five of the Z values, subject only to three
restrictions. One, the values of the Zs must lie between zero and one.4 9
419. The constraints on the feasible Z values are in fact somewhat narrower.
For example, the sum of Zb and Zx must be less than one. But such
complications do not become relevant in any of the actual maximizations
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Two, we constrain the feasible values of the Zs to those for which every
income group continues to earn positive income. 5 0 And three, the directions
of the pressures of apartheid must not be reversed, lest we lose a sense of
the realities involved. 5 1
The various white interest groups examined are shown in the first column
of Tables V-1 and V-2. The values of the five Zs that maximize each white
sub-group's total income are shown in Table V-1. Note that two numbers,
separated by a slash (I), are given whenever different Z values emerge under
different combinations of production function parameters.
There is a great deal of spread, across different production function
assumptions, in the maximizing values of the Zs in Table V-1. But a few broad
generalizations can be drawn.52 Almost no one wants to keep blacks in the
reserves (at least for reasons of economic self-interest), but the different
white groups have very different ideas about where they should go.
Manufacturing and "other" capital want nonwhites extensively let into the
cities and into skilled jobs in their own sectors. White farmers, urban
unskilled white labor, and mining capital want them kept out of the cities
conducted. Notice also that we are ignoring any political, technical, or
educational constraints to the setting of the Zs; this is done quite
intentionally, in order to uncover the interests of the different interest
groups. Constraints on the rate of training that would be needed to move
massive numbers of nonwhites into skilled positions will be considered in
Section VI.
50. Constraining the labor variables to be non-negative is sufficient to
insure this.
51. In the model, this means: 1) requiring Ybla < yrur < yurb, for otherwise
urban nonwhites must be prevented from returning to the rural areas and
rural nonwhites from returning to the reserves; 2) requiring Yu < Ys, for
otherwise skilled whites must be prevented from masquerading as unskilled;
and 3) requiring 2 . 5 Yerb < Y , for otherwise skilled nonwhites would be
paid more than skilled whites. Not only does this third condition reflect
political feasibility, it also reflects the sense of the job ladder, since
skilled nonwhites are doing less skilled jobs than skilled whites (within
the category of skilled labor). The number, 2.5, in the third inequality
is chosen arbitrarily; any number slightly larger than the values of Dnsm
and Dnso would do.
52. The maximizing values of the Zs for each of the white groups are discussed
and explained in detail in Appendix D.
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Table V-1
Labor-Market Restrictions Preferred by White Groups
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Notes: 1. The values of the five Zs are those that maximize the relevant
white group's income. (See text for constraints on the maximization.)
2. A slash C/] indicates that the maximizing values of the Z differed
according to whether all Es were set at -0.5 or all at +1.0.
(and out of skilled work). The interest of mining capital only diverges in
that it would like to increase the fraction of mining jobs done by
nonwhites. 5 3
The four columns of Table V-2 show the changes that each group's
maximization would make on the incomes of various groups: 1) the percentage
increase of the maximizing group's own income if it had this chance to select
the five Zs; 2) the percentage change in the total income of all other whites
(including farm and resource rents and returns to capital, where relevant); 3)
the percentage change in the incomes of all nonwhites (including those in the
Black agricultural sector); and 4) GDP. These percentages also are given as
ranges (separated by a slash) where different results have emerged from
different production function combinations.
The white group that would be most clearly able to improve its lot, were
it to get free reign over the Z values, is white farming. The other groups
with such ability are white mining labor and white urban unskilled labor. No
other group we have examined here would be able, by choice of Zs, to raise its
own income by as much as two thirds. There is a less clear pattern to the
damage one white group could do to all other whites' incomes -- usually the
damage is less than one fifth.
Were white groups able to choose Z values, it would make a big difference
to nonwhites. The Z choice of manufacturing and "other" capital actually
would raise the incomes of nonwhites, through their increased access to urban
and skilled jobs. A choice by mining capital would hurt nonwhites, but not by
as much as would a choice by white mining labor, white unskilled labor, or
farming. 5 4  In general, GDP would be lowered by the Z choices of mining
53. It may seem surprising that under any circumstances white mining labor or
white skilled labor would want to increase the fraction of its jobs turned
over to nonwhites. But, as nonwhites are added, the weighted average wage
rate of such labor (both white and nonwhite) falls and the total demand
for that kind of labor thereby rises. When the production function
elasticity of substitution is high, this demand increase outweighs the
initial loss; when the elasticity of substitution is low, it does not.
54. The choice of Z values that would be made by urban skilled labor might




Impact of Preferred Restrictions on Different Income Shares
Effect of the Chosen Zs on Income Shares (5 Change from 1980)1
Maximizing White
Income Grp Own Group Other Whites Nonwhites GDP
Farmers +76/+239% -23/-12% -30/-29% -19/-15%
Labor:
Mining +38/+251 -7/-4 -38/+27 -11/-8
Urban
Unskilled +94/+104 -29/-9 -41/27 -29/-11
Skilled +12/+28 -11/-4 -38/+5 -8/+2
Capital:
Mining +21/+22 -11/-14 -13/-8 -6/-5
Manufacture +45/+63 -8/-6 +2/+61 +3/+15
"Other" +23/+53 -15 /-10 +43/+70 +9/+15
Notes: 1. The slash [/] indicates the maximizing values of the Z differed
according to whether all Es were set at -0.5 or all at +1.0.
capital, white mining labor, urban unskilled white labor, or farming; GDP
would be raised by the Z choices of manufacturing or "other" capital. 5
5
The broad outline of the political economics are clear. No one has an
economic motive for keeping the population of the Black reserves so high.
Urban skilled labor stands between the allied interests of manufacturing and
"other" capital and the allied interests of farmers, mining labor, and urban
unskilled labor with respect to the extent to which nonwhites should be let
into urban and skilled jobs. Unfortunately, a closer analysis of this
political side of the choices cannot be conducted without greater information
about the sectoral production functions involved - as it is, too many of the
Z choices are heavily dependent on the production function parameters being
assumed. 56
VI. Simulations: What Would a Free Labor Market Look Like?
The world is not either-or and there is no realism in the question, what
would a free labor market have looked like in South Africa in 1980? The
transition there will either be piecemeal and gradual, over a long period of
time, or be accompanied by such upheavals and fresh distortions that the model
constructed here will give little idea of the emergent economy's workings.
Nevertheless, as an exercise in estimating the inefficiencies and
redistributions of apartheid, we now simulate the outcome of the model under
the idealized circumstances that all the artificial labor-market restrictions
were absent in 1980.
It is not enough merely to adjust one's mind-set to admit interest in
such counter-factuals. There are practical problems as well in such
exercises. First, the labor-market distortions are not the only ones that
55. Note that the impact of the Z choice by urban skilled labor depends upon
the production function parameters considered.
56. Unlike Sections IV and VI, this section offers the interested reader
little chance to participate through the use of Eureka. As an example of
the models used, the program for maximizing total urban white skilled
labor incomes with respect to several of the Z values (others have to be
assumed) is given in Appendix F (file name: MAXUSWL), but we found it very
difficult to locate solutions with Eureka in this case.
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exist in the South African economy. There are two other kinds: 1) market
interventions have been made independently of the labor-market distortions,
either for other purposes or as other ways of discriminating against nonwhites
in the economy -- two important examples that are relevant here are the racial
ownership pattern of land and the differential access of the races to
education; and 2) there are secondary distortions that flow from the labor-
market misallocations -- for example, neither the volume nor the allocation of
capital is the same as it would have been if a free market in labor had long
been effective. The simulations we are about to undertake, with the model of
this paper, cannot consider these other distortions and hence, implicitly,
must hold them all constant. In an important sense, then, we are simulating
no more than a partly free-market economy, and the results are lower-bound
estimates of what could be achieved by the removal of all apartheid
restrictions.
The second practical problem is the treatment of skills and the ability
of the economy to transform unskilled (nonwhite) labor into skilled labor.
5 7
Education and the ability to do skilled work are complexly intertwined, and
this model contains none of this complexity. If we simply remove all the Z
constraints from the model, thinking that is what a free market would achieve,
we would find in our simulations that all wage rates were driven to equality
(subject to the unexplained D wage differentials and the differentials due to
education); not only would white and nonwhite wages become equal but also
skilled and unskilled wages would become equal. The simulated economy would
simply transform unskilled workers into skilled workers until the marginal
productivities of the two kinds of labor were equalized. This ignores two
problems: 1) some nonwhites will never be able and willing to do skilled work
(a fact we have already incorporated into the model for unskilled white
labor); and 2) the skilling of the nonwhite work force will take time and
education, neither of which is our model capable of handling.
This problem, the rate of skilling of nonwhites, does not pervade the
entirety of the model. With respect to two of the labor-market restrictions,
it does not apply at all, namely Zb and Zy, the flow of nonwhite labor in and
57. This is not a problem (here) with white labor, for we have simply taken as
given the number of whites who are unwilling or unable to become skilled
labor. We will continue to take this same number as given.
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out of the Black homelands and the flow of nonwhite labor in and out of the
so-called "white urban areas". But genuine questions arise about the extent
to which, even with no formal restraints, nonwhites could quickly increase
their participation in the mining sector (g), where they already hold nearly
90% of the jobs, and in the skilled labor of the manufacturing (m) and "other"
(o) sectors, where they currently do around 20% of the jobs.
We will try to encompass this problem with two simulations, one that
constrains the free-market solution to a modest increase in Zg, Zm, and Zo,
and one that permits a much greater increase. These will be called the
simulations with "slow skilling" and "fast skilling":
-- The "slow skilling" simulation will allow nonwhites in the mining
sector to move into half the jobs now held by whites there. 5 8  Meanwhile, in
the manufacturing and "other" sectors, the "slow skilling" simulation assumes
that nonwhites could move quickly into 10% more of the skilled jobs than they
now (1980) hold. 5 9
-- The "fast' skilling" simulation will allow nonwhites in the minin-g
sector to move into all the jobs now held by whites there. 6 0  In the
manufacturing and "other" sectors, the "fast skilling" simulation assumes that
nonwhites could move quickly into 20% more of the skilled jobs than they now
hold. 6 1
58. Zg will be permitted to rise from its base 1980 fraction, .890, to .950.
In terms of effective laborers -- i.e. taking account of the extra six
years of schooling of the average white - Zg will be permitted to rise
from .851 to .931.
59. Zm and Zo, now .252 and .168, respectively, could therefore rise as high
as .352 and .268, respectively. In terms of effective labor, this means
that Zm could rise from its current .192 as high as .277, and that Zo
could rise from its current .125 as high as .205.
60. Zg will be permitted to rise from its base 1980 fraction, .890, as high as
one. This means that Zg can rise as high as one in terms of effective
laborers as well.
61. Zm and Zo, now .252 and .168, respectively, could therefore rise as high
as .452 and .368, respectively. In terms of effective labor, this means
that Zm could rise from its current .192 as high as .368, and that Z0
could rise from its current .125 as high as .291.
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Beyond these problems, the adaptation of the model of Section II to a
situation without labor-market restrictions is fairly straightforward. The
wage differential between unskilled urban whites and unskilled urban nonwhites
disappears (i.e. the parameter, F, in equation (20) becomes one). The rural-
urban unskilled wage differential among nonwhites also disappears. Thus, yrur
Yrb y * 62  Nonwhite urban skilled wages remain higher than these by the
extent of the skill differentials (Dnsm and Dnso). 6 3 Skilled white wages (Ys)
will still be higher than all of the other wage rates because of skilled
whites' continued - albeit reduced -- dominance in scarce skills. The
complete model for the simulations of this section is written out in Appendix
E.64
Table III-1 showed the actual outputs and incomes generated in the South
African economy in 1980 by sector and race. Table 111-2 showed the actual
sectoral allocations of labor by race in 1980. These provide the benchmark
for the subsequent comparisons. The two comparisons to be examined in this
section are the total removal of all labor-market barriers, first with "slow
skilling" and then with "fast skilling". Of the 64 combinations of production
function parameters, we will look in each case at only one, that which causes
the smallest increase in GDP. For each of the skilling assumptions, the
smallest GDP increase occurs with the combination when all the sectoral
elasticities of substitution are one half. 6 5 This should be no surprise since
low elasticities of substitution mean that marginal products decline rapidly
as one adds particular factors of production.
62. And all these three wage rates also equal Ybla if there is anyone left in
the Black reserves after free exodus is permitted.
63. We assume that these differentials remain unchanged, but the assumption
can be defended only on grounds of inertia where ignorant. The sudden
skilling of large numbers of nonwhite workers could drive these
differentials either down or up, perhaps dramatically.
64. The bare model, which is also capable of being solved with "Eureka", is
shown in Appendix F (file name: FREEVARY) to permit the interested reader
to check the results of this section or to explore new dimensions.
65. And Ab is unity. Recall that an elasticity of substitution of one half
means a value of E in the production functions of +1.
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The "slow skilling" assumption. The levels and percentage changes (from
actual 1980) are shown, for sectoral outputs and racial incomes, in Table VI-1
and, for labor allocations, in Table VI-2. Relaxation of all the labor-market
constraints, together with the "slow skilling" rate of assimilation of
nonwhites into skilled jobs, raises GDP by 5.7%.66 (See Table VI-1.) Output
goes to zero in Black agriculture, declines by nearly one fifth in European
agriculture, rises slightly in mining, and increases dramatically in the
manufacturing and "other" sectors (by 6.4% and 12.3%, respectively). This is
the efficiency gain. Income redistribution also occurs. Nonwhite incomes
rise by 7.3%, while white incomes rise by only 5.1%. But this overall figure
for white incomes hides a great deal of reallocation of incomes among whites.
Unskilled white incomes fall by 43.8% and white farm incomes (the imputed
returns to white labor, capital and land in European agriculture -- i.e. IFOO)
fall by 30.6%, while total profit (which is assumed to be all white-earned)
rises by 13.7% and white skilled labor incomes increase by 2.3%.
The causes of these changes are readily seen by looking at the labor
allocations in Table VI-2. Once permitted to exit, nonwhite labor completely
leaves the Black agricultural sector and also exits to a lesser extent (going
from 19% of the nonwhite labor force to 14%) from European agriculture.
Nonwhites increase their share of the mining labor force, largely replacing
whites who move to skilled jobs in the "other" sector. Finally nonwhites move
extensively into the so-called "white urban" sectors - i.e. manufacturing and
"other" -- increasing both their skilled and their unskilled employment there.
Not all nonwhites gain by this complete removal of labor-market barriers.
"Urban" nonwhites, both skilled and unskilled, are less well off after the
massive influx of new nonwhites from the rural sectors. Specifically, the
nonwhite wage rate changes are shown below (in R 000s and with the unexplained
wage differentials, i.e. the D parameters, assumed unchanged):
66. The GDP increase can reach as high as 6.9% when other production function
parameters are inserted, along with the "slow skilling" assumption.
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Table VI-1
South African Economic Structure. Slow Skilling Simulation
- Sector ---- Race --
Agriculture Row








- - -- 4.224 13.744





0.000 0.888 - - - 0.888 0.000 0.888
-- -- 10.889 7.128 10.019 28.036 - 28.036
0.000 2.808 13.493 13.976 31.110 61.387 15.791 45.596
(=GDP)
Percentage Change from 1980 Base
Sector -M---------- Race --
Agriculture Row
Black Euro. Mining Manuf. "Other" Totals Nonwhite White
Wage Income
Skilled - - - 2.2% 9.3%
Unskilled -- -9.6% -1.4% -6.3% -1.5%
Nonwage Income
IFOO -100.0% -30.6% - -- --
Profit - -- 0.9% 14.9% 30.6%












Note: 1. See Table III-1 for definitions of terms.
Table VI-2
Allocation of Labor in South Africa, Slow Skilling Simulation
(As Percentage of Total Labor Supply by Race)
Agriculture





















Percentage Change from 1980 Base
Agriculture




















Notes: See, Table 111-2 for definitions of terms.







Finally, it is interesting to examine certain aggregates of the economy,
before and after these changes. The ratio of wages (white and nonwhite,
including farm incomes) to GDP falls from 57.54% to 54.33%, owing to the
overall boost in profits. The ratio of all white wages to all (white and
nonwhite) wages (again including farm incomes as wages) falls from 55.97% to
52.65%, showing the relative shift from white to nonwhite laborers. Finally,
the ratio of total white incomes (i.e. wage, farm, and profit) to GDP falls
from 74.66% to 74.28%, indicating that the gains to profit almost exactly
equal the losses to unskilled white labor (and farmers).
The "fast skilling" assumption. The levels and percentage changes (from
actual 1980) are shown, for sectoral outputs and racial incomes, in Table VI-3
and, for labor allocations, in Table VI-4. Relaxation of all the labor-market
constraints, assuming the "fast skilling" rate of assimilation of nonwhites
into skilled jobs, raises GDP by 8.6%.67 (See Table VI-3. ) Output again goes
to zero in Black agriculture, declines by more than one third in European
agriculture, again rises slightly in mining, and increases even more
dramatically in the manufacturing and "other" sectors (by 9.3% and 18.9%,
respectively). The efficiency gain of freeing the labor market is even larger
if nonwhites can move more extensively into the skilled jobs from which they
were previously barred. Even greater income redistribution occurs with the
"fast skilling" assumption. Nonwhite incomes rise by 34.1%, while white
incomes actually decline, by 0.1%. But the near constancy of this overall
figure for white incomes hides a huge reallocation of incomes among whites.
Unskilled white incomes fall by 61.2%, white farm incomes (the imputed return
to white labor, capital and land in European agriculture -- i.e. IF00) fall by
67. The GDP increase can reach as high as 10.7% when other production function
parameters are inserted, along with the "fast skilling" assumption.
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Table VI-.3
South African Economic Structure. Fast Ski 1 1 i nQ Si1 t 1 1t
Sector Race --
Agriculture Row
Black Euro. Mining Mal f . "Other" Z oy i t±.e
-- - - 3.907 13.261 17.169 5.073











- - 4- 0.593
10.915 7.528 11.231 29.675




Percentage Change from 1980 Base
Sector - -- ---- Race M
Agriculture Row








-- - .55% 5.5%



















Notes: ~iotes:1. See Table III-1 for definitions of terms.
53.7%, and white skilled labor incomes fall by 19.0%; only (white) profit
income rises, by 20.3%.
To see the causes of these changes, look at the labor reallocations in
Table VI-4. As with the "slow skilling" simulation, nonwhite labor completely
deserts the Black agricultural sector; nonwhite labor in European agriculture
also declines a great deal, from 19% of the nonwhite labor force to 10%.
Nonwhites take over all the mining jobs, replacing whites who move to skilled
jobs in the "other" sector. Finally nonwhites move extensively into the so-
called "white urban" sectors - i.e. manufacturing and "other"; they increase
both their skilled and their unskilled employment there but most spectacularly
their skilled employment (the percentage increases are 142% and 213%,
respectively).
With "fast skilling" as with "slow skilling", not all nonwhites gain by
this complete removal of labor-market barriers - but the "fast skilling"
assumption comes close to making all nonwhites gainers. The "urban"
nonwhites, both skilled and unskilled, are less well off by only a few
percentage points after the massive influx of new nonwhites from the rural
sectors. The nonwhite wage rate changes are shown below (in R 000s and with
the D parameters assumed unchanged):







Next, let us look again at certain of the aggregates of the economy,
before and after the "fast skilling" changes. The ratio of wages (white and
nonwhite, including farm incomes) to GDP falls from 57.54% to 52.95%, owing to
the sizeable increase in profits. The ratio of all white wages to all (white
and nonwhite) wages (again including farm incomes as wages) falls from 55.97%
to 40.90%, showing the immense relative shift from white to nonwhite labor
incomes. The ratio of total white incomes (i.e. wage, farm, and profit) to
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Table VI-4
Allocation of Labor in South Africa, Fast Skilling Simulation

























































II-2 for definitions of terms.
GDP falls from 74.66% to 68.71%, indicating that the gains to whites through
increases in profit, large as they are, do not come close to offsetting the
losses to unskilled white labor, skilled white labor, and white farmers.
Finally, let us look at the Lorenz curves that emerge from removing the
apartheid labor-market restrictions. Figure VI-1 shows the Lorenz curves for
labor incomes onl_. 6 8  Each relaxation of the restrictions, from 1980 to the
"slow skilling" simulation and from the "slow skilling" to the "fast skilling"
simulation, unambiguously reduces labor-income inequality. The first
relaxation, to the "slow skilling" job structure, makes its principal impact
in the lower left part of the Lorenz curve, as it permits the poorest of the
nonwhites to escape from the Black agricultural areas and to relocate as
unskilled laborers in mining and even the "urban" sectors. The second
relaxation, to the "fast skilling" job structure, makes its biggest impact in
the upper right part of the curve, where large numbers of previously
suppressed nonwhite skills blossom and the incomes of skilled workers are
thereby brought down.
Figure VI-2 shows the same Lorenz curves, but with profit income also
included.69 These Lorenz curves behave very much like the previous ones until
the final few percentage points of the cumulative labor force are reached,
where they begin to cross. The post-apartheid income distributions do not
dominate the 1980 base distributions in the sense that the Lorenz curves do
not lie for their entirety above the 1980 Lorenz curve. The explanation is
profit. The infinitesimal number of white profit-collectors are made much
better off by the transition; when the very poor and the very rich both gain
at the expense of the middle income groups, Lorenz curves generally cross and
68. Recall that farm incomes (IFOO) -- part land rent, part return to capital,
and part labor income -- are included in these labor incomes.
69. We have no information on the distribution of profit income across wage-
earners and non-wage-earners, so we simply assume that all profit is
earned by an infinitesimal number of white persons (which explains why the
Lorenz curves appear to terminate below the point (1, 1). The distance
between the apparent termination and unity is the profit share of GDP.
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Figure VI-].
Lorenz Curves, 1980 and Simulded
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proclaim uncertainty about whether the income distribution has become less
inequitable or not. 7 0
Actually, it is possible to make welfare statements about crossing Lorenz
curves. Efficiency and equity comparisons can be made simultaneously through
the use of "generalized Lorenz curves", which are ordinary Lorenz curves with
the values on the vertical axis converted to absolute income figures by being
multiplied throughout by the mean income per capita. 7 1  Dominance for such
"generalized Lorenz curves" is formally equivalent to second-order stochastic
dominance -- which means preferred for a widely acceptable set of utility and
social welfare functions.
Figure VI-3 shows the "generalized Lorenz curves" for the three
situations we have been discussing - there is almost dominance, in the sense
that a risk-averse person of (ex ante) indeterminate race, class, and skill,
facing random relocation to South Africa, would prefer the "fast skilling"
economy there to the "slow skilling" economy, and the latter in turn to the
actual 1980 economy. The "almost" in the preceding sentence is necessary
because there is a slight crossing at the 99.9% (labor force) point --
reflecting the extent to which the free-labor-market simulations drive down
white farmer incomes. 7 2
Removal of the apartheid restrictions, whether with "slow skilling" or
with "fast skilling" transfers of jobs to nonwhites, leads to dramatic
70. These Lorenz curves cross twice, although the second crossing is made
invisible by the infinitesimal number of profit-receivers.
71. Such "generalized Lorenz curves" of course still begin at (0, 0), but they
do not terminate at (1, 1). Rather they terminate at (1, mean income per
capita). Since population (i.e. labor force) is fixed throughout the
simulations done here, we will multiply the Lorenz curve ordinates (i.e.
cumulative percentages for incomes including profits) by total GDP to
reach "generalized Lorenz curves", which means that they terminate at (1,
GDP). Those drawn in Figure VI-3 in fact terminate at (1 + a little, GDP)
so that the profit share can be more clearly discerned.
72. From a total of R1.280 billion in 1980 to R0.888 billion in the "slow
skilling" simulation and to RO.593 billion in the "fast skilling"
simulation. White farmers might begin to exit under these circumstances,
and nonwhite farmers might once again begin renting and farming "white
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increases in GDP and in the equity of its distribution. Furthermore, the
reader should be reminded, the GDP changes estimated here are almost certainly
lower-bound estimates, for three reasons: 1) the production function
parameters applied in this section are those that yielded the smallest GDP
increases, with other choices producing GDP increases of up to R1.2 billion
more (in the "fast skilling" simulation); 2) the removal of labor-market
restrictions would probably be accompanied by the breakdown of other, non-
labor-market apartheid restrictions that would add to and interact with those
simulated here; and 3) in addition to the short-run effects simulated, long-
run changes in education, land ownership, and capital allocation would quickly
begin to come into play, bringing further GDP increases and income
redistributions.
VII. Summary and Concluding Comments
For so long a paper, -it should be a little embarrassing to state that it
can be briefly summarized. But for those who have read carefully, a brief
summary is probably all that is needed; and for those who have not, a brief
summary is probably all that is wanted.
A model of the South African labor markets was produced (Section II) that
was, while very simple, too complex to yield general qualitative
implications.73  This model identified four ways in which non-market forces,
both legal and (increasingly) informal, restrict the mobility of nonwhite
labor in South Africa: 1) the extent to which nonwhite labor is free to leave
the designated rural "homeland" areas (captured in the Zb variable of the
model); 2) the extent to which nonwhite labor has access to the better jobs in
the mining sector (the Zg variable); 3) the extent to which nonwhites can
ascend to skilled jobs in the manufacturing and "other" sectors (Zm and Zo);
and 4) the extent to which nonwhites can acquire residency rights in the urban
areas and hence access to "urban" jobs (Zx) . The data of 1980 were then used
73. As did its generative predecessors, the much more simple models of Porter
(1978) , Lundahl (1982), and Lundahl and Wadensjo (1984).
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to "calibrate" this model -- that is, the data were used to insure that the
assumed model indeed generated the observed 1980 data (Section III).74
The first set of simulations involved piecemeal changes in the labor-
market restrictions (Section IV). When only one of the five restrictions
(i.e. the Zs, seen as parameters of apartheid) was marginally altered, rarely
was the (absolute value of the) elasticity of any important economic outcome
as high as one. Changing the restrictions one at a time just does not lead to
much change in the overall economic picture -- the elasticity of GDP, for
example, with respect to the five Zs is never higher than 0.1. And, with few
exceptions, sectoral outputs and wage rates are also unresponsive. The
simulations support what is often said: apartheid cannot be dismantled bit by
bit.
Next, the question was raised, what kinds of labor-market restrictions
(again, the Zs, now seen as choice variables) would the various white sub-
groups choose if each (in turn) had the power to choose them so as to maximize
its own income (Section V)? None of the white sub-groups, we discovered, has
a strictly economic motive for keeping so many blacks in the reserves as are
in fact found there in 1980. Beyond that, the interests of the various white
sub-groups diverge. Urban (i.e. manufacturing and "other") capital would like
to expand the entry of nonwhites into the cities and into skilled jobs. White
farmers, white mining labor, and white urban unskilled labor would like to
keep nonwhites out of the cities and out of skilled jobs. White urban skilled
labor stands between these groups, wanting some influx of nonwhites into the
urban areas, primarily (but not necessarily entirely) for unskilled work there
to enhance the relative scarcity of white skilled labor. Mining capital, not
surprisingly, is primarily interested in turning mining jobs over to
nonwhites.
Finally, we looked at a simulation of a system of perfectly free labor
markets, where the Zs emerge as solution variables -- incidentally and
unimportantly as firms and workers all seek optimization in unfettered labor
markets (Section VI). These simulations displayed the extent of the
inefficiency and of the redistribution inherent in the restricted labor
74. Also Appendices A, B, and C.
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markets. Depending upon whether nonwhites are able to move slowly or rapidly
into newly opened skilled job opportunities, GDP rises by about five to ten
percent. 7 5  Rural nonwhite wage rates rise dramatically, by up to one half,
urban nonwhite wage rates (both skilled and unskilled) fall somewhat. White
profit is increased much, white skilled incomes are affected little, and white
unskilled labor and white farming is seriously hurt by the emergence of free
labor markets. The Gini coefficient of the labor-income-only Lorenz curve
falls from .45 in 1980 to .38 (with "slow skilling") or .29 (with "fast
skilling"). Because profit actually increases with the freeing of the labor
markets, the Gini coefficient of the both-labor-and-profit-income Lorenz curve
falls much less, from .68 in 1980 to .67 (with "slow skilling") or .61 (with
"fast skilling"). The combined effects of the efficiency gains and the
redistributions, as seen in-the "generalized Lorenz curves", suggest that the
free-market simulations (almost) completely dominate the 1980 situation.
It is obligatory in efforts like these to conclude with some observations
about what remains to be done. Here, such observations carry the additional
advantage of reminding the reader, once more, of what has not been done.
There are, of course, inevitably many directions in which this research has
not gone; the actual explorations are limited only by one's time and by one's
faith that the model can generate interesting results. But some things not
done that could be done stand out:
1. The data underlying all the simulations are those of 1980. While
there are advantages to choosing that year, data from other years should be
explored, if only to reassure ourselves that 1980 and its data are not
atypical of the period. More and better data would mean more than just
increased confidence in the simulations. The parameters of the production
functions could rest more on fact and less on presumption; unemployment, of
both nonwhites and unskilled whites, could be considered rather than just
75. The "slowly or rapidly" refer to the "slow skilling" and the "fast
skilling" assumptions.
76. While the assumed values of the E parameters do not seem to have
sensitively affected most of the results, we were never able to examine
the effects of the assumption of the same elasticity of substitution
between the two kinds of labor (skilled and unskilled) and between each
kind of labor and the (assumed constant quantity of) other factors.
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assumed away; wage differentials between sectors and between skilled and
unskilled nonwhites could be meaningfully incorporated rather than just
assumed constant even under radically differing circumstances; etc.
2. Capital is implicit in the model throughout (buried in the C
parameters of the production functions). Neither changes in the volume of
capital nor reallocations of capital among sectors occur in any of the
simulations. Reliable capital stock data are difficult to find, but not
impossible. One way to include explicit consideration of capital would be to
make the same "small open economy" assumption about capital as we did for the
sectoral outputs of South Africa and to calibrate the 1980 data with an
equation requiring the equality of the value of the marginal product of
capital with the international rate of return to capital (perhaps with a risk
factor to reflect the special conditions of South Africa today). With such
treatment, we could have asked two additional kinds of questions: to what
extent does apartheid distort capital allocations, and to what extent would
redistribution of the ownership of physical capital improve the income
distribution?
3. The treatment of human capital in this monograph is terribly
simplistic. Not only is it impossible to ask interesting questions about the
effects of (hypothetical) reallocations of human capital (or educational
investments), but the interrelation of educational attainment and job
qualification is assumed very unrealistically to be additive and separable. 7 7
If one more sector could be added to the model, one that provides education --
and perhaps other welfare services - on a policy rather than a profit basis
would be the compelling choice. 7 8
77. Nowhere does the shortcoming of this assumption become more clear than in
Section VI, where the "slow skilling" and "fast skilling" assumptions need
to be added quite arbitrarily simply because the model cannot contemplate
limits to the rate at which relatively uneducated people can take on more
skilled jobs.
78. There are two technical directions in which this kind of modeling could
go, with the gain of realism, but at the cost of immense complexity. One
is to introduce time and explore the dynamics of phased removal of
nonwhite restrictions, of the gradual improvement of nonwhite education,
and of the growth of nonwhite saving and wealth in response to improved
economic opportunities and well-being. The other is to introduce a non-
traded-goods sector (which in turn requires the introduction of complete
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We come to the end of a long road. Is there a short, simple conclusion?
We think so. Total removal of the labor-market restrictions that apartheid
has proliferated by itself could raise GDP by several (5-10) percentage points
and could raise the standard of living of nonwhite workers -- some of whose
incomes might rise by as much as one half. Some whites would actually gain --
those who earn profit. Some would not be hurt, or would not be hurt much --
skilled whites. And some would suffer serious declines in their living
standards -- white farm owner/operators and unskilled whites. But much
inequality would remain. And it cannot be removed without venturing where
this model does not, into the racial reallocation of ownership of land,
physical capital, and most importantly human capital. Concern with these is
the next concern of those who would contemplate South Africa without
apartheid.
The judge thinks that he is just when he compares
the oil of another's lamp
with the light of his own.
Rabindranath Tagore
7 9
sets of demand equations, probably by race as well as by class) and
explore the changes in the composition of South Africa's production that
follow from redistribution of income.
79. Tagore, 1928, p. 198.
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Appendix A: Data Sources
The South African data for 1980, used in this paper, are derived from
numerous sources. This means that we have risked inconsistency across
sources, but we found it necessary if we were to achieve the coverage and
reliability needed.1
Our principal problem arose with the "Black agriculture" sector. The
Department of Statistics of the Republic of South Africa publishes annual
statistics on most of the aspects of the nation's economy needed here.
However, since 1976, it has excluded from its reports statistics on
"homelands" once they had been declared independent by the South African
government. This exclusion- would have been of little consequence if the data
on the "independent states" had been listed separately or published elsewhere.
Unfortunately, the agency also ceased collecting data on these regions. Data
on the "Black" regions began being collected under the initiative of the
Tomlinson Commission in 1950-51. This function was later taken over first by
the Bureau for Economic Policy and Analysis (BEPA) and then by the Bureau for
Economic Research, Cooperation, and Development (BENSO). The statistical
methods used by the Department of Statistics and by BENSO differ, and indeed
the statistical techniques used by BENSO have been seriously questioned
(Abedian, 1983).
Two concerns dictated the choice of 1980 as the base year. First, we
wanted the base year to be recent enough to portray the economic position of
apartheid as it exists "today". And second, we needed a year in which
sufficient data existed that we could be confident in the numbers we
ultimately selected. 1980 was the most recent year that fulfilled the second
criterion.
The data used are given in Table A-1 and explained in the remainder of
this appendix. All the base data are for 1980 and are in annual rate. Value
data are in Rands, the South African unit of currency. The international
value of the Rand fluctuated greatly in the years around 1980, but as a
1. Others have trod a similar path: "The key to the use of many, if not most,
South African statistics is to recognize their limitations and generally to
treat them as flawed orders of magnitude..." (Savage, 1986, pp. 184-185).
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mnemonic approximation, one Rand can be thought of as one U.S. dollar. Output
values (Q) are in billions of Rands, income (i.e., wage rate) values of (Y)














South African Economy 2- 1980.1,2
Agriculture
.4 It 15
Black European Mining 4anufacturing "Other .
0.414 3.403 13.432 13.139 27.701
0.902 1.301 0.731 0.995 2.696
0.014 0.090 0.061 0.221
-- -- -- 0.101 0.220
-- -- -- 0.300 1.089
0.459 1.632 2.052 2.484 2.388
6 12.684 5.412 4.620
- -- -- 4.848 5.820
-- -- -- 12.144 10.368
1. Labor is in millions of workers, wages in thousands of 1980
Rands, and outputs (at factor cost) in billions of 1980
Rands.
2. Labor and wages, in agriculture and mining, have been
counted in one skill category only, called "unskilled" in
the table.
3. No whites work in Black agriculture.
4. Includes gold, diamond, coal, and other mining and
quarrying.
5. Includes construction; electricity, gas, and water;
transport and communications; trade and finance; and public
administration and defense.
6. There is no entry here since the breakdown of white income
into wages, land rent, and capital earnings was unavailable
in this sector.
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Output (i.e. Value Added). All figures are from I.B.R.D. (1983) except
for the output of "Black" agriculture (Qb). These are shown for the various
homeland regions in Table A-2.
Table A-2
Output of "Homeland" Regions












Source: Survey, 1983, p. 363.
Labor. The total white and nonwhite labor figures are from South, 1982.
The percentage distribution between skilled and unskilled jobs, for both
whites and nonwhites, is derived from the occupational distribution by
population group in South, 1983, p. 503. We classified transport, service,
production, and laborer as unskilled and professional, managerial, clerical,
sales, foreman/supervisor, and artisan as skilled. With this categorization,
about 73% of the skilled jobs are done by whites and about 5% of the
unskilled. The fact that we group "blacks", "coloreds" and "Asians" together
under nonwhites is not to suggest that they form a homogeneous group.
Important differences between and within each group exist, as evidenced by
Table A-3. Nonwhite labor in Black and European agriculture is from








Whites 0.090 -- 0.090
Blacks 0.7163 -- 0.716
Colored 0.013 - 0.013
Asians 0.002 -- 0.002
Manufacturing
Whites 0.360 0.300 0.061
Blacks 0.772 0.041 0.731
Colored 0.228 0.035 0.192
Asians 0.097 0.025 0.072
"Other"
Whites 1.311 1.089 0.221
Blacks 2.335 0.124 2.212
Colored 0.455 0.071 0.384
Asians 0.135 0.035 0.100
Notes: 1. All labor in millions of workers.
2. All mining labor counted here under unskilled.
3. Includes 0.220 foreign workers.
Wages. The wage figure given for nonwhite labor in Black agriculture is
the calculated average product in this sector (i.e. 414/.902); it is not the
figure used in the text for Ybla,2 Nonwhite wages in European agriculture
include in-kind as well as cash payments (Survey, 1981, p.157).
3  The
remaining wage data (i.e. median pay by race and skill) were taken from
Survey, 1983, p. 125 and I.L.O., 1981, p. 52.
2. See Appendix C.
3. The average monthly wage for farm laborers in Swartland, Ruens, Eastern
Free State, Western Transvaal, North Western Free State, and Transvaal
Highland was converted into an annual figure.
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Next, we calculated the ratio of the skilled wage to the unskilled wage





We then calculated the total wage bill for each racial group (I.L.0., 1981, p.
52 and the labor data already gathered). This left only the problem of
solving for one unknown, the unskilled wage, from one equation.4 For white
labor in the manufacturing sector, for instance, the following equation is
used:
(Al) (Wagews)(Laborw 5 ) + (Wagewu)(Laborwu) = (average white wage in
manufacturing)(total white labor in manufacturing), or
(A2) [(2.243)(0.300) + (0.061)](Wagewu) = (0.917)(0.361),
which yields Wagewu = 0.451. Multiplying this white unskilled wage rate,
Wagewu, by 2.243, we get Wagews = 1.012 as the white skilled wage rate.
Multiplied by 12 to put them in annual terms, these are the wage data used in
the text. This procedure was followed for each of the relevant sectors.
To do'these same calculations for nonwhite labor, we weighted the wages
by the proportion of each racial subgroup at each of the two skill levels we
consider. The implicit assumption that the wage differentials between the two
skill levels for each racial subgroup are the same across sectors is not
serious. After all, the focus of this study is on nonwhites as a group, not
on the composition of the three subgroups. Table A-4 gives the racial
composition of skilled and unskilled jobs in various sectors, and Table A-5
the racial breakdown of the average monthly wages, which have been used in the
estimation of the nonwhite average monthly wage.
4. The skilled wage can then be solved for by simple substitution.
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Table A-4
Percent Racial Composition of Skilled and Unskilled Job in Various Sectors
Blacks Coloreds Asians
Mining















































Appendix B: Production Function Parameters
There are five sectors in the model, and in each of them a constant-elas-
ticity-of-substitution (CES) production function is assumed to be adequate to
capture the relationship between the flows of labor input(s) and the value of
output. For three of the sectors ("Black" agriculture, "European" agricul-
ture, and mining), only one kind of labor is considered; for these, the CES
production functions each contain three parameters (A, C, and E, with
appropriate subscripts). For the other two sectors (manufacturing and the
"other" sectors), both skilled and unskilled labor are considered; then, a
fourth parameter appears (B). Here, we use the data of the base year, 1980,
to make empirical estimates of some of these parameters. 5
The precise estimation procedure differs slightly among the five sectors,
but each follows roughly the same course. The base-year data on value of
output and on labor input(s) permit us to estimate one of the parameters. The
observed wage and the assumption that this wage rate equals the value of the
marginal product of that labor permit us to estimate one more parameter (or
two more parameters in those production functions with two kinds of labor).
There remains, in general, only one unidentified parameter. 6
We are free to choose which single parameter should remain unidentified,
and for each sector we choose E -- the parameter that is related to the
elasticity of substitution. In the discussion of each of the sectors below,
the estimates of A and C (and sometimes B) are given for a range of assumed
values of E. 8 The estimated production functions are pictured for each sector
at values of E of plus one (elasticity of substitution equal to 1/2) and of
5. See Appendix A for the base-year data, its derivation, and its sources.
6. The exception to this procedure is Black agriculture, for reasons to be
discussed shortly.
7. Recall that in a CES production function (as we have written it) the
elasticity of substitution among the various factors is equal to (1/(1+E)).
8. The possible range of E is from minus one to plus infinity. The negative
values indicate elasticity, and the positive values inelasticity in the
degree of substitutability among the factors. The estimates at a value of
E equal to zero are not reported because the CES production function
changes form at that value (to the Cobb-Douglas).
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minus 1/2 (elasticity of substitution equal to 2). These are the values of E
used in the simulations of the text. This range should be sufficiently wide
to give a good indication of the degree to which the results of the
simulations depend upon the E value assumed. 9
1. Black Agriculture (b). The production function is
(B1) Qb = Ab[(Lnb)-Eb + Cb-1/Eb.
To estimate the three parameters (Ab, Bb, and Cb), there is only one piece of
information from the 1980 data - namely, the value of output (Qb) and the
quantity of labor input (Lnb). There are few meaningful wage data that
emanate from the African agricultural areas and still fewer efforts to
estimate shadow wages there. This means that two of the three parameters must
be assumed, or guessed at from extraneous information. For a variety of
assumed values of Ab and Eb, Table B1 shows the estimate of Cb implied by the
1980 output and labor data.
Figures B1 - B4 show the average and marginal products of labor for four
of the Ab, Eb, and Cb values in Table B1. These values of the three parameters
are:
Figure Ah Eh
B1 1.00 1 1.307
B2 10.00 1 23.046
B3 0.01 -0.5 5.485
B4 0.10 -0.5 1.085
This range of values of Ab and Eb (with the implied values of Cb) should
encompass the reality of the production function in these areas, and all four
will be utilized in the simulations of the text.
2. European Agriculture (e). The production function is
(32) Qe =Ae(Lne + Le-Ee + Ce1-1/Ee,
and the condition that the wage rate equal the marginal product of labor is
9. Rarely do empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution in sectoral
production functions fall below 1/2 or rise above 2. See, for examples,
the following and the studies cited therein: Wallis, 1979, Chapter 2;
Mayes, 1981, Chapter 3; and Intriligator, 1978, Chapter 8.
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TABLE E1
Implied Values of Cb























































































3.238 ERR ERR ERR
3.179 ERR ERR ERR
2.949 ERR ERR ERR
2.680 ERR ERR ERR
2.195 ERR ERR ERR
1.773 ERR ERR ERR
1.405 ERR ERR ERR
1.B:5 . ERR ERR ERR
0.806 ERR ERR ERR
0.562 ERR ERR ERR
0.349 ERR ERR ERR
0.163 ERR ERR ERR
0.079 ERR ERR ERR
0.015 ERR ERR ERR
ERR 0.008 0.031 0.055
ERR C) .04C 0.167 0.311
ERR 0.082 0.365 0.721
ERR 0.172 0.870 1.976
ERR 0.271 1.568 4.155
ERR 0.381 2.532 7.936
ERR 0.501 3.862 14.489
ERR 1.307 23.046 240.437





NOTES: 1. *** means the number is 1,000 or larger.
2. ERR means the implied value of Cb is negative.
Such values mean negative and/or rising values for
the.marginal product of labor.
3. The implied value of Cb is zero for all assumed
values of Eb when the assumed value of Ab is
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If a value of Ee is assumed and the 1980 base-year data inserted, the above
two equations yield estimates of Ae and Ce. These are shown in Table B2 and
the production functions pictured in Figures B5 and B6 for values of the
elasticity of substitution at 1/2 and 2.
3. Mining (g). Both white and nonwhite labor are used in this sector,
and the formulation of the production function considers the two to be perfect
substitutes for each other. The production function is
(B4) Qg = AgC(Lng + LwgY-Eg + Cg]-1/Eg,
and the wage condition is
(B5) ZgDgYrur+(1-Zg)DgYs=Ag[1+Cg(Ln+Lg)Eg]-(1+Eg)/Eg,
The fact that the marginal product of labor is set equal to the weighted
average of the wage rates of the two races of labor reflects the condition
imposed on the mine-owners that black and white labor must be hired in fixed
proportions.10
The 1980 data for white labor must be adjusted to allow for the fact that
white workers on average have six years more schooling than nonwhites. At our
assumed 6% rate of return to each year's additional education, the 90 thousand
white mining workers become 128 thousand "effective workers". And
accordingly, the average annual white wage rate in mining of R12.684 becomes a
wage rate of R8.942 per effective worker. In solving equations (B4) and (B5),
the figures for effective workers and their wage rate must be used. 12
10. The ratio is Zg nonwhite to (1-Z ) white. Note that the same sort of
condition as (B5) would appear i we were to assume that nonwhite and
white labor were perfect complements in production, rather than perfect
substitutes. This softens the harshness of the assumption. (See text for
the definition, and Appendix C for the 1980 values, of the D parameters.)
11. 128 equals 90 times 1.06 to the sixth power.
12. To be consistent, the fraction of nonwhites in the total mining labor
force (Zg) must also be recalculated using effective workers. The 1980
value of Zg then falls from .890 to .851.
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TABLE B2
Implied Values of Ae and Ce
(for various assumed values of Ee)
Ee= Ae= Ce =



























NOTE: 1. *** means the number is 1,000,000 or larger.
Figure 35
Production Function: European Agric.
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Figure B6
Production Funclion: European Agric.
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The values of Ag and Cg implied by various assumed values of Eg are shown
in Table B3, and the production functions are pictured in Figures B7 and B8
for two values of the elasticity of substitution (i.e. values of 1/2 and 2).
4. Manufacturing (m). The production function is
(B6) Qm=AmEBm(Lnum+Lwum)-Em+(Lnsm+Lwsm)-Em+Cm3-1/Em.
Note that there are now two kinds of labor, skilled and unskilled, imperfectly
substitutable for each other. 13 This necessitates the introduction of another
parameter, Bm.
The two conditions (one each for skilled and for unskilled labor) equa-
ting the observed wage rate with the relevant marginal product of labor are
(B7) Dnuyrb=AmBm[Bm+Cm(Lnu+Lwum)Em+{(Lnum+Lwum)/(Lnsm+Lwsm)}Em]-(1+Em)/Em;
and
(B8) ZmDnsmy rb+(1-Zm)Dwsm= .
Am[1+Bm{(Lnsm+Lwsm)/(Lnum+Lwum) }Em+Cm(Lnsm+Lwsm )Em]-(1+Em)/Em.
Notice here that the left-hand (i.e. the wage) sides of these two equations
are conceptually different. This reflects the two different ways in which
apartheid enforces the employment of whites despite their higher wage rates.
In the unskilled labor category, all the jobs are reserved for whites until
all whites seeking such jobs are employed; only then may employers hire
nonwhites at their lower wage rates. This means that, at the margin, the
relevant wage rate to equate to the value of the marginal product is the wage
rate of nonwhite unskilled labor. In the skilled labor category, however,
certain jobs are entirely reserved for whites, while the rest (at the lower
rungs of the skilled part of the job ladder) are entirely open to nonwhites.
If we assume that these two parts of the skilled labor force must be expanded
or contracted together (i.e. the two are perfect complements), then at the
relevant margin employers are hiring partly a nonwhite skilled worker (Zm) and
13. But whites and nonwhites are perfect substitutes for each other within
each skill class. This obviously inaccurate assumption proves troublesome
in Section VI, when more than marginal changes in the labor-market
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NOTE: 1. *** means the number is 1,000,000 or larger.
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partly a white skilled worker (1-Zm). Thus equation (B8) utilizes a weighted
average of the two wage rates of such workers.
Here, too, white labor must be adjusted for education. This means that
the white labor figures are multiplied by 1.06 to the sixth power, and the
white wage figures are divided by 1.06 to the sixth power in order to
calculate the effective-worker figures. The corrections are shown below:
















The implied values of Am, Bm, and Cm are shown in Table B4 and two
production functions pictured in Figures B9 and B10.
5. "Other" Sectors (o). The statistical procedures are exactly the same
here as in the manufacturing sector. The production function and the two wage
conditions are exactly like equations (B6) - (B8) with the subscript o
replacing the subscript m throughout. The corrections needed to convert


















The implied values of A0 , Bo, and Co are shown in Table B5, and two of the
production functions are displayed in Figures B11 and B12.
TABLE E4
Implied Values of AD, Bm, and Cm














































































































NOTE: 1. *** means the number is 1,000,000 or larger.
Figure B9
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TABLE B5
Implied Values of Ao, Bo, and Co














































































































NOTE: 1. *** means the number is 1,000,000 or larger.
Figure Bll
Production Function: "Other" Sectors
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Production Function: "Other" Sectors















Q 2 4 6 8
UnskHild Lar (Lriuo + Lwuo)
+ Ls = .0 0 L = 1.5
10
J3 = o.5 .d 1..s = 2.0
Appendix C: Other Empirical Content
The purpose of the paper and its simulations is to compare the existing
(1980) situation in South Africa with a variety of counterfactual situations
in which the various restrictions on nonwhite labor movements and allocations
are altered. It is therefore necessary to "calibrate" the model of Section II
to the data of 1980. Here, only the base-period parameters and variables will
be discussed -- the raw data and its sources and complications are treated in
Appendix A.
The production functions of each of the five sectors each contain three
or four parameters (A, C, E, and sometimes B) in addition to the labor
inputs.14 But the output and input data of 1980, plus the assumed equality
then of wage rates and marginal products of labor, greatly reduce the extent
to which these parameters can vary. Appendix B derives these parameter
constraints and shows the range of production functions that will be used in
the simulations. In general, only the (assumed constant) elasticity of
substitution is free to vary, and values of that parameter of 1/2 and 2 will
be examined. 15
Only in the case of agriculture in the Black reserves (subscript b) is
the production function not reduced to one parameter, owing to the absence of
labor market data there. There, the parameters, A and E, are both free to
vary and a range of four cases is considered in the simulations.16
Thus, in the simulations, as many as 64 combinations of production
functions could be considered -- four for Black agriculture and two for each
of the other four sectors.17 The table below summarizes the twelve relevant
production functions to be utilized:
14. Equations (1) - (5) of Section II.
15. E is the parameter that relates to the elasticity of substitution, and
values for it of -1/2 and 1 will be examined.
16. E is still assumed to lie between -1/2 and 1, as in the other four
production functions.




Production Function Parameters Utilized
Sector (Subscript) A B C E
Black Agriculture (b) 0.010 -- 5.485 -0.5
0.100 -- 1.085 -0.5
1.000 -- 1.307 1
10.000 - 23.046 1
European Agriculture (e) 1.034 -- 0.665 -0.5
4.067 - 0.438 1
Mining (g) 0.605 - 3.785 -0.5
79.542 -- 4.757 1
Manufacture (m) 2.469 0.454 1.110 -0.5
79.329 1.335 2.904 1
"Other" Sectors (o) 3.233 0.438 0.839 -0.5
34.588 0.975 0.358 1
Note: -- means not applicable (i.e. only one kind of labor is used).
The population in South Africa in 1980 was about 29 million people
(including 4 million in the "independent" homelands). The measured labor
force was, however, only 8.721 million. These consisted of 1.775 million
white workers (Lw), of whom 14 thousand were farmers (Lwe), 61 thousand were
unskilled workers in manufacturing (Lwum), and 221 thousand were unskilled
workers in "other" sectors (Lwuo)- The nonwhite labor force was 6.946 million
(Ln). 1 8
We turn next to the quantitative restrictions on nonwhite labor
allocations. These are multifarious and often obscure in the South African
economy, but we choose to highlight five. One, the fraction of nonwhite
laborers that are required to stay inside the Black reserves (i.e. working in
the Black agriculture sector) -- Zb. Two, the fraction of the jobs in the
mining sector that the job-reservation system there permits to be done by
18. These L values are needed in equations (6) - (8) and equations (16) and
(17).
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nonwhite labor -- Zg. Three, the fraction of the skilled jobs in
manufacturing done by nonwhites -- Zm. Four, the fraction of skilled jobs in
"other" sectors done by nonwhites -- Zo. And five, the fraction of the
nonwhite labor force with "section 10" access to manufacturing and the "other"
sectors (together called the "white urban" sectors). In 1980, the values of
these fractions:






In the basic model, the actual 1980 replication of Section III, where the
model is solved as 28 equations in 28 variables, the above values of the Zs
are substituted into inequalities (13) through (17) as both the lower and
upper limits on the Z variables. 1 9
There is also a racial quantitative allocation for unskilled laborers in
both the manufacturing and "other" sectors in that white applicants go to the
front of the relevant queues. The parameter that this constraint involves
appears in the price equation, equation (18), whereby the white workers earn a
wage rate that is F times that of nonwhites. In 1980, the value of F was
1.935.20 Unskilled whites then earned roughly double the wage of unskilled
nonwhites.
The model incorporates five basic wage income variables, Y (and many wage
differential coefficients, D, to be discussed shortly):
19. When free labor markets are considered, on the other hand, the above 1980
values of the Z ratios will be ignored, and all the Zs will emerge,
through market forces, of course between zero and one. In fact, in
Section VI, limits on the rate of job-upgrading of nonwhites will be
considered and will appear as constraints on some of the Zs; but then the
limits are no longer artificial.
20. This is the F value in the "other" sector -- which is the one that is
normalized.
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Ybla-- the value of the marginal product of labor in Black
agriculture (in thousands of Rands per annum). Its value in 1980 depends upon
which of the four production functions for Black agriculture are used:
Assumed Eh Assumed Ah Estimated Ybla
-. 50 .01 R0.068
-. 50 .10 RO.214
1 1.00 R0.211
1 10.00 RO.021
Note that the estimates of Ybla in the final column of the above table are
estimates of the value of the marginal product of labor there (as opposed to
the average product there -- see Appendix A -- known in 1980 to be R0.459).
They vary quite a bit -- indeed, there is an order of magnitude between the
highest and the lowest. In the simulations, we would use these estimates if
we wanted to divide Black agricultural income between the share attributable
to labor and the share attributable to other factors. But the variance of
these estimates discourages this, and there is little purpose to it, anyway,
since the two shares are usually received by the same people. What Ybla does
disclose is the opportunity cost of the migration of a family's marginal
worker from the homelands to one of the "modern" sectors.
yrur -- the wage rate of nonwhite labor in the "rural white" sectors
of the economy (in thousands of Rands per annum). More precisely, it is the
wage rate of nonwhites in the unskilled jobs of European agriculture and, with
the appropriate (D) differential, mining. In 1980, the value of y ur was
R1.632.
Ynrb -- the wage rate of nonwhite labor in the "urban white" sectors
of the economy (in thousands of Rands per annum). More precisely, it is the
wage rate of nonwhites in the unskilled jobs of the "other" sector and, with
appropriate differentials, unskilled jobs in manufacturing and skilled jobs in
both these sectors. In 1980, the value of Yur b was R2.388.
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Yu--the wage rate of white unskilled labor. 2 1  Its value in 1980
was R4.620 per annum. 2 2
YW -- the wage rate of white skilled labor. 2 3 The value in 1980 was
R10.368 per annum.
Each of the other seven wage income variables is derived as a relative
differential to one of the above five Y values. These differentials are
denoted D with an appropriate subscript. The definitions of these
differentials and their 1980 values are given in the table below:
Definition of the D Variables 1980 D Values
Yng = DngYnur Dng = 1.257
Ynum = Dnumynrb Dnum = 1.040
Ynsm = Dnsmyurb Dnsm = 2.030
Ynso = Dnsoynrb Dnso =2.437
Twum = Dwumw Dwum = 1.171
Twg = DwgY Dwg = 1.223
Twsm = DwsmYw Dwsm = 1.171
Since we will assume that these values of D are due to extraneous factors
and persist despite changes in the job rules of the various counterfactual
simulations, we should take a minute to reassure ourselves that the above D
values make sense. Among rural nonwhites, mine workers earn a wage one fourth
higher than workers in European agriculture (Dng = 1.257). This differential
seems reasonable: such farm workers are generally illiterate, rustic, and/or
old. Unskilled nonwhites earn about the same wage in manufacturing as in the
"other" sector (Dnum = 1.040) . Skilled work pays two to two-and-a-half times
as much as unskilled work (Dnsm = 2.030 and Dnso = 2.437), a plausible premium
21. In the "other" sector. The wage rate of unskilled white labor in
manufacturing is tied to it through a wage differential, D.
22. Note that the ratio of the 1980 value of YO to the 1980 value of Ymod is
the 1980 value of F (i.e. 4.620/2.388 = 1.935).
23. Again, in the "other" sector, with the white skilled wage rate in
manufacturing and mining tied to it through differentials, D.
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.for the marketable skills, regular attendance, and careful application that
such workers must display.
The differentials for white workers are much smaller. Unskilled whites
earn somewhat more in manufacturing than in the "other" sector (Dwum = 1.171);
and skilled whites earn the same differential in manufacturing compared to
skilled whites in the "other" sector (Dwsm = 1.171). The aggressive and well-
organized white miners earn nearly one fourth more than skilled whites in the
"other" sector (Dwg = 1.223) and slightly more than skilled whites in
manufacturing (1.223 vs. 1.171).
The fact that the ratios of skilled to unskilled wages are similar now
(i.e. in these 1980 data) for whites and nonwhites lends some support for the
assumption, otherwise bald, that the values of Dnsm and Dnso would not change
if all apartheid restrictions on nonwhite labor were removed (as is done in
the simulations of Section VI).
Appendix D: Maximizing Incomes of White Subgroups
In Section V, the values of the five Zs that maximize the incomes of
various white subgroups are derived and presented. Here, we look in detail at
each of those subgroups and their preferred Z values. The purpose is to make
intuitively clear the level and the spread (where the values vary greatly
across production function assumptions) of these maximizing values of the Zs.
White Farmers. These farmers' incomes are larger the more nonwhite
laborers are urged and/or pushed onto their farms. The maximizing Zs are all
zero, tempered only slightly by two things: 1) some nonwhite labor may have to
be kept (or more accurately, permitted to stay) in the Black reserves to
prevent the marginal product of labor there from rising above the wage the
white farmers are paying, which would draw labor back to the reserves; and 2)
some nonwhite labor must be permitted into the cities (though in unskilled
jobs only) in order to prevent the wage of white skilled workers there from
falling to the level of the white unskilled wage there.
Wht iigLbr The spread of the maximizing Zs in the case of the
white mineworkers indicates that they face two very different kinds of
strategies, with their preference between them basically dependent on the
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elasticities of the production functions faced. The only two consistent
elements of the two strategies are: 1) the desire to empty the Black reserves
to provide labor for the other four sectors, and 2) the determination to keep
nonwhites out of skilled jobs in the manufacturing and "other" sectors. When
the elasticities of substitution are low, nonwhite labor is steered to
European farming and unskilled urban jobs (i.e. not to mining); the skilled
wage is driven up by this influx of unskilled labor, and the white mineworkers
take all the mining jobs and a high wage, too. When the elasticities of
substitution are high, the strategy of white mining labor is quite different.
Now, nonwhite labor is kept out of the urban areas, forcing down the rural
nonwhite wage. These low-paid nonwhites are permitted to continue to hold a
vast majority of the mining jobs, but their low wages greatly expand the
demand for white labor there in the remaining jobs. Although the skilled
white wage declines slightly, the numbers of white miners are expanded
greatly. 2 4
White Urban Unskilled Labor. Different production function parameters
lead to different results with respect to whether most of the nonwhites are
kept in the reserves or permitted into mining jobs, but there is no
ambivalence about the urban part of the maximizing allocation from the
viewpoint of unskilled whites. Nonwhites are permitted into the urban sectors
only in sufficient numbers to keep the skilled white wage from falling to the
level of the unskilled white wage; and no nonwhites are permitted, into skilled
jobs.
White Urban Skilled Labor. This group would like to let the nonwhites
out of the reserves, and permit them to flood into the cities, largely if not
entirely for unskilled work. This enhances the scarcity of the skilled
workers, and hence their incomes. The maximizing values of all the Zs make
clearest sense when the inelastic CES production functions (E=1) are used: Zb
=Zg =Zm = o=0, and Zx .73. But when the elastic production functions
are applied, an apparent anomaly appears. The optimizing values of Zm and Zo
rise above zero (to 0.47 and 0.11, respectively). Why should skilled whites
invite nonwhites into skilled jobs? Recall that the demand for skilled labor
24. And recall, it is the total income of white miners, not their wage rate,
that is being maximized here. For discussion of this difference, see the
paragraphs on White Urban Skilled Labor, below.
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is determined by the weighted average of the skilled white and the skilled
nonwhite wage rates. Nonwhites earn much lower wages. As they are increased,
this weighted-average skilled wage rate falls, the total demand for skilled
labor increases greatly (when production functions are elastic), and skilled
whites actually gain from the entry of the nonwhites into skilled jobs. In
short, skilled whites may want some skilled jobs turned over to skilled
nonwhites, provided they are poorly enough paid.
White Mining Capital. This interest is clear -- to remove the color bar
that prevents more complete use of nonwhite labor in the mines. But mining
capital would also like to let relatively few nonwhites into the cities
because that restriction increases mining capital's labor pool and hence
lowers the wages nonwhite miners must be paid.
White Manufacturing Capital. Manufacturing capital wants nonwhites to be
drawn into the city in sufficient numbers to bring down the gaps between rural
and urban nonwhite wages and between unskilled and skilled white wages. In
short, manufacturing profit is served by increases in Zx and Zm.
White "Other" Capital. The strategy here is the same as for
manufacturing capital except that it is now Zo, rather than Zm, whose increase
is desired.
Appendix E: The Model Without Labor-Market Restrictions
In Section VI, the artificial labor-market restrictions are removed.
This requires changes in many of the equations (and inequalities) of the model
presented in Section II. Here, those changes are spelled out. The equation
numbering here follows that of Section II, with identical equations
identically numbered and altered equations indicated with a prime (').
The production functions for the five sectors are unaffected by the
removal of labor-market restrictions:
(1) Qb = Ab[(LnbX-Eb+Cb-1/Eb;
(2) Qe = Ae[(Lne+Lwe)-Ee+Ce]-1/Ee;
(3) Qg =Ag[(Lag+Lg)Eg+Cg]1/Eg;
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(Li) Qm = Am[Bm(Lnum+Lwum)-Em+(Lnsm+Lwsm)-Em+Cm]-1/Em; and
(5) Qo = Ao[Bo(Lnuo+Lwuo -Eo+(Lnso+Lwso)-Eo+C ]-1/Eo].
Neither are the labor-market summation identities affected:
(6) Lnb+Lne+Lng+Lnum+Lnsm+Lnuo+Lnso=Ln and
(7) Lwe+Lwg+Lwum+Lwsm+Lwuo+Lwso=Lw.
Nor are the definitions of the Zs:
(8) Lnb Z= b(Ln);
(9) Lng = Zg(Lng + Lwg);
(10) Lnsm = Zm(Lnsm + Lwsm);
(11) Lnso = Zo(Lnso + Lwso); and
(12) Lnum+Lnuo+Lnsm+Lnso = Zx (Ln) .
The constraints on the Zs, expressed in equations/inequalities (13) -
(17), certainly do change. Under apartheid, they are fixed by custom and/or
law, whereas in a free market they will be determined by the equalities of
marginal products and wages, bounded only by zero and one and constrained only
by the ability of particular labor to do particular jobs. Let us look at each
Z in turn:
Zb -- Either Ybla becomes in a free market as high as yrur or there will
be no labor willing to stay in the Black reserves. Formally, (13) becomes
(13') Zb(ynur - ybla) = 0,
Zb > 0, and
Ynrur >ybla,
Zg -- Since nonwhite labor is cheaper than white labor, mine-owners faced
with a free labor choice will increase the nonwhite fraction of their work
force as much as the ability to upgrade nonwhites permits. This fraction is
written Zmax, and
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(14') Z = Zmax,
g g
The numerical values to be employed for Z ax are discussed and given in the
text.
Zm -- Here too, the only constraint on the replacement of white skilled
workers by nonwhites is their ability to gain the necessary skills quickly: 2 5
(15') Zm = Zmax,
See the text for the numerical values of Zmmax.
Zo -- Here too:
(16') Zo = Zoax.
See the text for the numerical values of Zmax.
Zx -- With "section 10" regulations removed, the fraction of the nonwhite
labor force in the "white areas" is unconstrained:
(17') 0 < Zx < 1 Zb.
Equations (18) - (21) are unaltered, except that F = 1 in equation (20)
once the special arrangements for unskilled whites are removed:
(18) Lwum = Lwum;
(19) Lwuo L=wuo;
(20') yu urb (i.e. F = 1); and
(21) Lwe = Lwe.
Similarly, there are no changes in the writing of equations (22) - (28), which
posit the equality of the marginal product of labor with its wage for the
various sectors and skill classifications:
25. This is technically true only as long as the wage of skilled nonwhites is






(24) DnumYnrb = AmBm[Bm+Cm(Lnum+Lwum)Em+
{(Lnum+Lwum)/(Lnsm+Lwsm) }Em]-(1+Em)/Em;
(25) Yurb=AoBo[Bo+Co(Lnuo+Lwu) Eo+
{((Lnuo+Lwuo)/ (Lnso+Lwso) 1Eo ]-(1+Eo)/Eo
(26) Z DngYnur+(1-Z )DgYS=Ag[1+C (Ln+L )Eg]-(1+Eg)/Eg.
(27) ZmDnsmy rb+(1-Zm)DwsmYs = Am[1+Bm{(Lnsm+Lwsm)/(Lnum+Lwum)}Em
+Cm(Lnsm+Lwsm)Em]-(1+Em)/Em;
and
(28) ZoDnsoynrb+(1-Zo)YS = A [1+Bt{(Lnso+Lwso)/(Lnuo+Lwuo)}Eo
+Co(Lnso +Lwso)EOo(+EO)/Eo
But the interpretation of.,. equations (26) - (28) is different. Under
apartheid, the Zs in these equations represented the maximum fraction of
nonwhite workers that were permitted to be hired; with free markets,
permission is not required. But our assumption about the rate at which
nonwhites can acquire the skills needed for skilled jobs means that, within
the category of skilled labor, employers must continue to hire whites and
nonwhites in proportions determined by the ability of each group to perform
the needed skills. Thus, the Zs in these equations proxy not law but a rate-
of-skilling assumption.
Since nonwhite workers would no longer be constrained in their movements
between country and city, there is one final equation needed, which has no
counterpart in the apartheid model of Section II:
(29') Y~ur , urb.
A rural-urban differential could be introduced to reflect differences in non-
pecuniary benefits (or costs), but currently observed South African
differentials offer few clues what it might be, so we ignore the possibility.
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This completes the free-market model. It contains the same 28 variables
in the model of Section II. The relevant 28 equations here are equations (1)
- (12), (13') - (16'), (18) - (19), (20'), (21) - (28), and (29').
Appendix F: "Eureka" Programs
The minimal basic models of the text can both be solved on a PC with the
aid of "Eureka", a software creature of Borland International. 2 6 The involved
reader is invited to check, to experiment, and to boldly go where we have not
-- the starter programs being given on the next three pages. 27
The basic model with labor-market restrictions, that presented in Section
II, is shown first (file name: APARTHEI). The maximizing model needed in
Section V is hinted at next (file name: MAXUSWL). Finally, the free-market
model explored in Section VI is written out (file name: FREEVARY).
26. 4585 Scotts Valley Drive, Scotts Valley, California 95066. The cost is
$39.95 under the Scholar Program.
27. For serious or extensive work, a mainframe is really necessary. "Eureka"
has a tendency to get carried away if the initialized values of the
variables are not carefully and closely chosen; and it has not the
capacity to carry out the subsequent share and Lorenz calculations (though
any spread-sheet program will).
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Eureka: The Solver
game of input file: A:\APARTHEI
;The model below is written in labor "efficiency unite 3 which seans that
;white labor measures have been nultiplied by (1.06'6) to account for their




























Eureka: The Solver -
daze of input file: A:VALXUSWL
;The Lodel below is written in labor "efficiency units", which reaps all
;white labor neasures have been rultiplied by (1.06'6) -to account for their
;greater education. The initial values are the solution values for all 1:1.
;The Ell program works best (i.e. at all) when not all Zs are let loose at






US WL:Yew*( 1. 17129 6$ Lwsn+Luso)
Qe:e(),.





















Bane of input file: A :\FREERYARY
;The parameter k represents the fraction of the maxirum skilled jobs that.
;nonwhites are able to do once a free labor-market appears. k:O means they
;are able to do no more than they were allowed to do under apartheid
;restrictions. k:1 Weans they are able to do all the mining jobs and. 20X
;Wore of the skilled jobs in manufacturing and 'other' than they were
;permitted to do under apartheid. 'Fast skilling" is k:1; 'slow skilling'























"bnso/(Lnco+Lwso):( 1-k) ( .220/( .220+1.54767) )+k* .29 1023,
Yblan::1.040 : Yrurn::1.979 : Ysw::7,256 : Zx::0.743
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